Why is Hybrid Warfare So Hard to Understand?
Christopher Case
1 October 2025
For the casual observer of contemporary media, hybrid warfare appears to be a newly developing concept employed by an actor to create a host of new security and stability challenges. Activities ranging from drones threatening critical national infrastructure such as airports, civilian maritime vessels ‘attacking’ undersea telecommunication and energy cables, to state-sponsored financial and political support to political parties with the intent of influencing elections, grab news headlines around the globe. As these reports flood the information environment, they often come with a tremendous amount of misunderstanding of exactly what hybrid warfare is and what it aims to achieve. Hybrid activities are not a new concept and are designed to spread ambiguity, be hard to detect or attribute, and be plausibly deniable.
One of the primary misconceptions of hybrid warfare is the perception of it being a new concept. However, looking into the concept deeper, we can see how the use of full-spectrum activities to achieve an objective dates back centuries, while the only new aspect of the concept is its name and our awareness of it. In fact, the name ‘hybrid’ was only created in 2007 by Mr. Frank Hoffman, who sought to better illustrate how an actor can employ other instruments of power than just military to seek its goals.
This concept is particularly challenging for us in the West to understand, as we tend to see the geopolitical environment through the peacetime, crisis, and armed conflict spectrum. In peacetime, we tend to believe states operate in good faith, and only in an armed conflict situation does an actor mean to do us harm. However, states such as Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea see themselves in a conflict currently, and the employment of a full spectrum of instruments of power seeks to exploit this Western perception to reduce the chances we will respond effectively and decisively to address hybrid threats.
Adding to the confusion surrounding exactly what hybrid warfare amounts to is the frequent renaming of the concept by scholars and experts seeking to better define it. Since 2007, names such as non-linear warfare, next generation warfare, indirect actions, and grey zone operations have been introduced by various people. These names often repackage the idea of hybrid warfare rather than introduce new aspects of the concept.
Another aspect which challenges our understanding of the concept of hybrid warfare is how it is frequently seen as an action rather than what it really is, which is a strategy. This strategy employs a coordinated use of multiple instruments of power to increase the chances of an actor achieving its intended goal. The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE) uses a thirteen-domain concept for understanding this full spectrum, while NATO uses the Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic, Financial, Intelligence, and Legal Operations/Law Enforcement (DIMEFIL) spectrum. While these methodologies have minor differences, the main intent of both is to illustrate how an actor often employs multiple instruments of power when seeking to influence others.
One major benefit of employing a full spectrum of instruments of power is the ability to control the escalation ladder in the vertical, horizontal, and lateral dimensions. For vertical escalation, an actor can increase or decrease its actions within a particular instrument of power, such as information operations or military actions. For horizontal, an actor can shift actions between instruments of power to either reduce the awareness of these operations or focus on potential successes. Lastly, lateral escalation sees the same overall level of operations or actions, yet shifts these actions between geographic regions to reduce the chances of the targeted audience’s understanding of these actions and possible response.
The 2014 Russian invasion and annexation of Crimea brought significant increased awareness of hybrid threats, as well as driving more confusion about the concept. For its invasion, Russian military forces removed insignia from their vehicles and uniforms, leading many to use the term ‘little green men’ instead of identifying these forces as almost certainly Russian. This approach to anonymous Russian forces illustrates another key aspect of hybrid warfare. Hybrid actions are intentionally designed to be ambiguous and plausibly deniable as a means to increase confusion and reduce the chances of an effective response being employed. If we in the West are busy discussing whether the event was an intentional action by an adversary or something else (criminal, accident, etc.), there is a higher probability of the event being addressed.
To further aid the chances of success when using its hybrid strategy, Russia employs the multilayered approach of active measures, reflexive control, and deep operations, which date back to Soviet times. This concept aims to influence the decision-making processes in targeted populations and governments. Russia’s use of active measures is a combination of overt and covert actions to influence events, undermine confidence in Western liberal democracies, and increase the perception of Russia. This is achieved using information operations, creating and supporting proxy elements, and conducting sabotage operations.
Similarly, the employment of the reflexive control theory aims to influence an adversary to make decisions or take actions which are more favorable to Moscow’s interests by distorting or manipulating the perceived reality. Using maskirovka techniques such as information manipulation or deception, Russia targets existing divisions in the targeted society and exploits known biases to achieve a desired outcome.
The concept of deep operations was a military doctrine which Russia adapted for use in its hybrid strategy. In its original form, deep operations focused on conducting conventional military strikes deep into enemy territory across the entire front line of contact and exploiting areas where a weakness is discovered. In its more modern form, Russia conducts a full spectrum of actions to determine which actions have the most success before opportunistically exploiting any detected vulnerabilities.
Author Information
Mr. Christopher Case is the senior intelligence analyst for Hybrid Threats and Emerging and Disruptive Technologies assessments at NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). He is a career intelligence officer with over twenty years’ experience in strategic, operational, and tactical analysis. Mr. Case served in the US Army for five years analyzing counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency topics and deployed to Iraq for sixteen months to directly support operations.
As a civilian analyst for the US Defense Intelligence Agency, Mr. Case analyzed a variety of problem sets and twice deploying to Afghanistan to support NATO operations. He also provided support to NATO’s Operation Unified Protector in Libya in 2011 before assuming his current position with SHAPE in 2019. Mr. Case holds a Bachelor of Arts in international affairs from Vesalius College and a Master of Arts in international conflict and security at the University of Kent’s Brussels School of International Studies. He is currently a PhD candidate with Leiden University researching the military implications for NATO from biotechnologies and human enhancement.