A troop withdrawal, a cancelled missile deployment, and a political rupture

In a line of recent disruptions in transatlantic security relations, President Donald Trump’s threat to substantially reduce the U.S. military presence in Germany marks one of the most serious. The Pentagon initially announced that around 5,000 U.S. troops would be withdrawn from Germany over the next six to twelve months. Yet Trump quickly suggested that this was only the beginning. “We’re going to cut way down. And we’re cutting a lot further than 5,000,” he told reporters in Florida when asked about the decision (Wälde 2026b; Grieshaber, Burrows, and Madhani 2026). Germany currently hosts around 36,000 of the approximately 68,000 European-stationed U.S. troops, making it the largest U.S. military basing location in Europe by far (Siebold and Rinke 2026; Keaten and Finley 2026).

The immediate rationale remains unclear. The Pentagon stated that the decision followed a “thorough review” of U.S. force posture in Europe, but reporting indicates that the move came in the context of growing U.S.-European tensions over Iran, tariffs, and burden-sharing within NATO (Grieshaber, Burrows, and Madhani 2026; Siebold and Rinke 2026). The timing has, nevertheless, invited a more political interpretation. Shortly before the announcement, Chancellor Friedrich Merz criticized Washington’s conduct in the Iran conflict during a school visit, saying that the U.S. was being “humiliated” by the Iranian leadership and lacked a clear strategy (Wälde 2026a; Madhani and Price 2026). A senior Pentagon official later described recent German rhetoric as “inappropriate and unhelpful” (Giuffrida and Henley 2026).

The decision is not limited to troop numbers. It also appears to have killed the Biden-era plan to deploy a U.S. long-range fires battalion to Germany, equipped with systems capable of firing Tomahawk cruise missiles and SM-6 missiles. This planned deployment was intended to strengthen NATO’s conventional deterrence against Russia until European states could field comparable capabilities of their own. Its cancellation, therefore, creates a serious long-range strike gap, particularly because Tomahawk missiles have a range of roughly 1,600 kilometers, far beyond Germany’s current Taurus missiles (Lunday and Jack 2026; Höller 2026).

German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius sought to frame the drawdown as a reminder of Europe’s own responsibility. “We Europeans must take on more responsibility for our own security,” he said, while also emphasizing that Germany was expanding its armed forces, accelerating procurement, and improving military infrastructure (Siebold and Rinke 2026). At the same time, Pistorius underlined that U.S. troops in Germany serve both sides of the alliance. “The presence of American soldiers in Europe, and especially in Germany, is in our interest and in the interest of the U.S.,” he told the German Press Agency dpa (Grieshaber, Burrows, and Madhani 2026).

This point is crucial. Trump’s rhetoric often treats U.S. troops in Europe as a service provided to allies who fail to pay enough for their own defense. Yet the U.S. presence in Germany is not merely a shield for Germany. It is also a central pillar of American power projection. Ramstein Air Base, Landstuhl Regional Medical Center, Grafenwöhr, and the headquarters of U.S. European Command and U.S. Africa Command are essential to U.S. operations far beyond Europe, including in the Middle East, Africa, and the Arctic (Bryan-Low, Off, and Guder 2026; Keaten and Finley 2026; Siebold and Rinke 2026).

From occupation force to global power projection hub

The U.S. military presence in Germany began after the Second World War, when American forces formed part of the Allied occupation and helped stabilize postwar Western Europe. During the Cold War, this presence became a central component of NATO’s deterrence posture against the Soviet Union. At its height, hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops were stationed in West Germany. Their mission was not only to defend German territory but also to anchor the Federal Republic firmly within the Western alliance system (Keaten and Finley 2026; Siebold and Rinke 2026).

After the Cold War, the strategic function of U.S. bases in Germany evolved. Rather than disappearing, Germany became less a front-line state against potential Soviet aggression and more a logistical, operational, and command hub for American military activity across several regions. Ramstein in particular became indispensable after 9/11, supporting U.S. operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Landstuhl treated casualties from those wars, while U.S. bases in Germany supported later operations in the Middle East and Africa (Bryan-Low, Off, and Guder 2026; Keaten and Finley 2026; Siebold and Rinke 2026).

This history complicates Trump’s argument that Germany is simply free-riding on U.S. security guarantees. The U.S. presence undoubtedly contributes to European deterrence, but it also enables Washington to act globally. Defense analysts have thus warned that a major withdrawal from Germany could damage U.S. interests at least as much as German or European ones. As The Guardian noted, European bases have become “key forward-staging sites and logistical hubs” for U.S. military operations, and large-scale withdrawals could reduce Washington’s capacity to operate around the world (Giuffrida and Henley 2026).

The same logic applies to the cancelled missile deployment. The planned long-range fires battalion was not only a symbolic reassurance measure. It was meant to address a concrete imbalance in Europe’s deterrence posture. Russian Iskander missiles stationed in Kaliningrad can reach large parts of NATO territory, including Germany. Nico Lange, founder of the Institute for Security and International Affairs, argued that the planned deployment was intended to correct this asymmetry. Without such capabilities, “deterrence gaps always mean weakness,” he warned (Lunday and Jack 2026).

The strategic problem is therefore twofold: First, the troop withdrawal risks weakening the political signal of U.S. commitment to Europe at a moment when Russia continues its war against Ukraine. Second, the cancellation of the Tomahawk deployment leaves Germany and Europe without a credible near-term substitute in the field of deep precision strike. As Christian Mölling, deputy director of the German Council on Foreign Relations, put it, the U.S. has a “factual monopoly inside NATO” on long-range fires, which makes the cancellation operationally more serious than the troop number itself (Siebold and Rinke 2026).

Germany’s choices: short-term repair, medium-term modernization, long-term European autonomy

The decision has been criticized not only in Europe, but also within the United States. Republican Senator Roger Wicker and Representative Mike Rogers, the chairs of the Senate and House Armed Services Committees, warned that “prematurely reducing America’s forward presence in Europe” risks undermining deterrence and sending the wrong signal to Vladimir Putin (Siebold and Rinke 2026). They also noted that Germany has increased defense spending and provided U.S. forces access to bases and airspace during the Iran conflict (Siebold and Rinke 2026; Grieshaber, Burrows, and Madhani 2026).

Germany has indeed moved significantly since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The Zeitenwende, including the €100 billion special fund for the Bundeswehr, marked a major break with decades of underinvestment. Berlin now wants to expand the Bundeswehr from around 185,000 active-duty soldiers to 260,000, although critics argue that this remains insufficient given the scale of the Russian threat (Siebold and Rinke 2026).

Yet the long-range strike gap cannot be closed quickly. One option would be for Germany to purchase Tomahawk systems directly from the United States. According to Politico’s reporting, German Defense Minister Pistorius had already made a formal request to his American counterpart to acquire long-range missile systems. But German officials have acknowledged that the process remains uncertain. Ministry spokesperson Mitko Müller said only that “the process is ongoing” (Lunday and Jack 2026).

There are also strategic and political obstacles. U.S. stockpiles have reportedly been strained by the Iran conflict, and Trump may simply be unwilling to approve such a sale. Lange therefore cautioned against relying too heavily on this route, warning that after the U.S. had used so much of its arsenal, he would “advise against it” (Lunday and Jack 2026). Even if Germany could acquire Tomahawks, a further question would immediately arise: would Berlin retain them solely for its own national and NATO deterrence, or would Ukraine ask for access to the same capability it has long sought from Washington?

A second option is to accelerate the modernization of Germany’s Taurus stockpile and the development of the Taurus Neo. Müller confirmed that Germany is “modernizing our Taurus missile stockpiles and developing the successor, Taurus Neo” (Lunday and Jack 2026). However, even an updated Taurus could not fully replace the U.S.-made Tomahawk. Fabian Hoffmann of the Oslo Nuclear Project noted that “the only thing that really stands out with the Tomahawk is range: around 1,600 kilometers.” While the Taurus Neo may eventually reach approximately 1,000 kilometers, Hoffmann warned that it is unlikely to be available before 2030 (Lunday and Jack 2026; Höller 2026).

The third and perhaps most strategic option is European development. Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and other partners are working through the European Long-Range Strike Approach, or ELSA, to develop missiles with ranges above 2,000 kilometers. This would provide Europe with a conventional deterrent independent of the United States. However, the timeline remains long. British-German planning documents refer to a capability “within a decade,” and German officials have refused to promise a specific date (UK Parliament 2026; Reuters 2025; Höller 2026).

This leaves Germany in an uncomfortable interim position. It cannot rely on the United States. It cannot yet rely on Europe. It can also not close the gap through national capabilities alone. Metin Hakverdi’s broader argument is therefore relevant: “A stronger Europe is not an alternative to the transatlantic partnership, but its prerequisite” (Hakverdi 2026). That should be the central lesson of the current crisis. Strategic autonomy should not mean anti-Americanism. It should mean that Europe becomes capable enough to keep the alliance balanced, credible, and politically resilient.

The policy recommendations follow from this logic. In the short term, Germany should continue to explore whether Tomahawk or Typhon systems can still be acquired from the United States, but it should not build its defense planning around that assumption. In parallel, Berlin should accelerate Taurus modernization, ensure sustained funding for the Taurus Neo, and examine whether other European systems, including French and British capabilities, can provide partial bridging solutions. In the medium term, Germany should make long-range strike a priority within NATO force planning and EU defense cooperation. In the long term, ELSA must become more than an announcement. It needs funding, industrial contracts, production timelines, and political ownership.

Lastly, there is also a diplomatic lesson to learn. Merz’s criticism of U.S. policy toward Iran may have been substantively defensible. Yet if a chancellor chooses to speak truth to power, this should be done with strategic purpose and full awareness of the likely consequences. Public remarks to school students should not accidentally trigger a major security dispute with Germany’s most important ally. The point is not that Berlin should avoid disagreement with Washington. The point is that disagreement must be deliberate, coordinated, and embedded in a broader strategy.

Trump’s troop threat and the cancelled Tomahawk deployment do not mean that the transatlantic alliance is finished. But they do show that Germany can no longer treat U.S. protection as politically automatic. The future of European security will depend on whether Berlin and Brussels can turn this disruption into a serious defense agenda. Together, Europe has the economic and industrial strength to become a credible security actor. Divided, it will remain dependent on a U.S. president whose commitment to Europe may change with every political grievance.

References

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Giuffrida, Angela, and Jon Henley. 2026. “US Withdrawing 5,000 Troops from Germany after Merz Says US ‘Humiliated’ by Iran.” The Guardian, May 1, 2026. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/may/01/trump-threatens-withdraw-troops-italy-spain-strait-hormuz.

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