The Venezuela Precedent:
The January 2026 military extraction of Nicolas Maduro marks a terminal point for the principle of sovereign equality. Operation “Absolute Resolve” demonstrates a pivot toward the “Donroe Doctrine,” wherein the United States asserts uncontested hegemonic authority over the Western Hemisphere. By utilising law enforcement as a pretext for regime change, the U.S. has provided a “playbook” for revisionist powers.

Crucially for European Security, this precedent effectively legitimises Russian territorial claims in Ukraine and erodes the moral authority required to uphold a rules-based international order

The new doctrine reveals a US that disregards the norms and institutions we have held dear over the last few decades. This disregard is made ever clearer in the Administration’s actions against Greenland.

The Greenland Ultimatum:
The opening of 2026 saw a shift toward unilateralism regarding the territorial sovereignty of Denmark, an EU member and NATO ally. This manoeuvre represents more than a localised dispute; it constitutes a direct challenge to the bedrock of the transatlantic alliance and a formal abandonment of the norms that have stabilised international relations for eight decades. Should the United States proceed with a military seizure of Greenland, the strategic rationale for NATO would cease to exist. Such an outcome would accelerate the transition towards a fragmented, multipolar order defined by competing spheres of influence, the very outcome sought by revisionist powers in Moscow and Beijing (Badawi, n.d.).

The Question of Taiwan:
These developments do tie into the question of Taiwan, specifically whether Europe and the US would close ranks with Taiwan in case of Chinese kinetic intervention. Recent developments in the relationship between Europe and the US seriously jeopardise such action, especially the aggression towards Greenland (Global Initiative, 2026). There is the core question: Would Europe come to the aid of Taiwan and the US if the latter has shown strategic disregard for treaty obligations? This brief argues that US unilateralism has created a credibility vacuum that renders European participation in a Taiwan contingency strategically untenable.

The Facture: From Partners to Protectorates
“Donroe Doctrine”: America’s New NSS
The new National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States demonstrates a serious shift in priorities from global security to a drive for “American pre-eminence in the Western Hemisphere…” (The White House, 2025). The NSS outlines a clear reorientation of resources and efforts to its own perceived sphere of influence, which is, in part, at the expense of European security. “American pre-eminence” also signals the intent to remove and restrict “Non-Hemispheric” actors from the region; the language of this strategy suggests the US views this hemisphere as its own and thus is not willing to share with others. In general, the language of the NSS is very clear in its prioritization of the US in the region, as well as globally in terms of economic power and relations. The NSS leaves limited room for real cooperation or compromise with allies and adversaries alike; it demonstrates a US striving to go it alone at the expense of partners. 

Furthermore, the new NSS actually outlines a strategy that actively undermines the integrity and security of allied partners. Specifically, it outlines notions of “civilizational erasure” and attacks the activities of the European Union, accusing it of undermining sovereignty and rights (The White House, 2025). Such language being in the NSS of the United States does not indicate that they are prepared to respect the sovereignty of European states, and more recently, regarding Greenland, we see that this is matched in action. 

The European Counter:
Europe has not been idle regarding the arrival of a confrontational and transactional US. European countries have come to realise that there needs to be a degree of de-risking. Such a shift is clearest when assessing the actions and statements of the Merz-led government in Germany, which has called on the continent to pursue its own interests, and effectively “emancipate” itself to a degree from American domination (OSW Centre for Eastern Studies, 2025). Germany wants to lead the charge on a “new European security architecture…” with itself at the centre and is acutely aware that the relationship with the US has shifted and that Europe must go it alone to some extent (Ibid.). There is also recognition that European defence spending must increase, and that Europe must take control over its own future, given the fact that the US is signalling a desire to reduce its efforts within NATO and simultaneously is willing to engage in internal political interference of supposed European partners. 

The American NSS does name Europe as an important partner and ally, and some experts reading the NSS point to this specific language and say that critics are exaggerating the risk (Luyken, 2025). However, the recent actions by the Americans have done little to assuage such concerns, and therefore, one must consider whether an openly confrontational US can feasibly rely on European partners to join it in a potential showdown with China.

The Core Conflict:
At the heart of this fracture is a paradox: The US wants Europe to follow its lead on Taiwan and China while simultaneously threatening the territorial integrity of European and NATO partners. There is a sense of strategic misalignment on the side of the US. It demands hemispheric supremacy while also expecting its European partners to be at its side when it actively works against them. Unless there is a change in action and circumstance, it is reasonable to argue that the transatlantic partnership is not fully functioning, leaving Taiwan in a perilous position.

The Taiwan Question: Wedge or Weld?
Economic Reality:
European states like Germany are stuck in a strategic autonomy paradox; they cannot afford to sanction their 2nd largest trading partner (China) while fighting a trade war with their 1st (the US). Furthermore, the current developments have meant that in 2025, EU-US trade flows contracted by 16.9%, while EU-China trade grew by 5.4% (approx. 660 billion Euros); such trends do not indicate a unified China policy between transatlantic partners (Lemaire, 2026). The economic pressure perpetrated by the US means that de-risking from China is unlikely, given that the combined economic loss could spell industrial collapse for a continent already struggling to maintain its industries (Ibid.).

The Moral Hazard:
Alongside the economic reality facing Europe regarding Taiwan, the US actions in Venezuela have caused irreparable harm to the rules-based order. Such a development is problematic for a US defence of Taiwan because if the US ignores the sovereignty of Venezuela, Greenland, and Europe, on what legal or normative basis can the US and Europe demand China respect the status of Taiwan?

Continuing, the fracturing of the transatlantic partnership through the pursuit of the “Donroe Doctrine” offers China two gifts. First, their rivals in the US and Europe are divided and fighting among themselves. Second, the concept of hemispheric pre-eminence championed by the US arguably provides justification for the Nine-Dash Line and claims on Taiwan. Experts may debate the notion that a “playbook” for a Chinese invasion of Taiwan has been written; however, what is established is that the US has no moral authority on the matter and lost its justification for its regional presence (Transatlantic Task Force, 2026).

European Reluctance:
The US would expect Europe to join it in the defence of Taiwan yet actively threatens European sovereignty through its aggressive pursuit of Greenland (Blockmans, 2026). Such actions are paradoxical. How could the US expect Europe to commit to the Pacific if it must focus on shore up its Atlantic front with the US?

As expected, Europe has begun to reorient its forces, with Germany among other European states announcing possible troop deployments to Greenland as a possible deterrence; this is echoed in rhetoric by European leaders (Brussels Morning, 2026). The NATO alliance is fracturing, and if the US becomes an aggressor, it will end the alliance and put Europe and the US on opposing sides, causing irreparable damage and simultaneously abandoning Taiwan. American threats against its own allies lead to a logical conclusion that there is little-to-no appetite for European support of the US in the Pacific; to do otherwise would be illogical and politically untenable.

Taiwan now is a secondary or even tertiary concern, a status that does not bode well for its security, considering a new world order and infighting among its allies.

Recommendations: A Roadmap for Realists
Multi-lateralising the Arctic:
The US shift toward the “Donroe Doctrine” and its ultimatum regarding Greenland represents a direct threat to the territorial sovereignty of the EU and NATO. Since the US now views the Western Hemisphere as its uncontested sphere of influence, Europe can no longer rely on the US as a security guarantor in the Arctic. Instead, Europe must treat the Arctic as a multi-lateral security zone where it must defend its own interests. To do so, Europe must:

• Establish Deterrence: European leaders, such as Merz, must formalise the troop deployments to Greenland to serve as a kinetic deterrent against aggressors.

• Legal Protections: European states must reject the US “playbook” of using law enforcement as a pretext for regime change or territorial acquisition, framing the Greenland issue as a matter of fundamental international law rather than a localised dispute.

• NATO Reform: Recognition must be given to the fact that if the US proceeds with aggression against Denmark and Greenland, then the rationale for NATO's existence becomes defunct. In a post-NATO world, Europe must prepare to have an Arctic region managed by a European-led security structure.

De-escalation and Red Line Diplomacy:
Recognition of the current fractured state of the transatlantic relationship calls for establishing a framework for managed friction to prevent the Greenland dispute from escalating into a broader conflict between allies. Doing so would allow for possible de-escalation in tensions and cooperation on the defence of Taiwan.

Hence, it is recommended that a form of crisis management mechanism be constructed that acknowledges the shift toward a multi-polar world order, while also protecting the European Atlantic front. A structure should include:

• High-level diplomatic meeting space: Define the boundaries of the “Donroe Doctrine” and draw red lines that neither party is to cross, with punishments being agreed upon in case of violations.

• Forum for negotiation: Enable what the German government has called emancipation. Specifically, provide a space where Europe can assume responsibility and burden for its own security in exchange for binding assurances that the US will not violate its territory.

The alliance is critical to both parties, so efforts to preserve it in the new world order are essential. Having room for negotiation and dialogue again frees up resources and attention to deal with the issue of Taiwan.

Strategic Autonomy regarding the Taiwan Question:
The recent actions by the US have undermined its moral authority and provided China a pretext for the invasion of Taiwan. Europe cannot afford to be tied to the American dismantling of the rules-based international order; it must demonstrate its commitment to these rules and norms. Europe must take the mantle that the US is abandoning. To take up the mantle, Europe must accomplish the following:

• Multilateralise the Taiwan Defence: Europe works with a coalition of middle-powers to codify the Taiwan Strait’s status as a vital international waterway independent of US presence, and to deter Chinese aggression.

• Develop Economic Resilience Markers: Europe must avoid becoming too dependent on China in the face of US actions. To do so, Europe should develop a sovereignty fund to protect vital industries from collapse in the face of a possible two-front economic war. Further, cooperation with other middle powers to diversify trade partners can help insulate from extensive damage.

• Strategic De-linking of Pacific and Atlantic Fronts: Clearly condition European support for the US in the Pacific on US respect for European territorial integrity; any such violation will cost the US a vital partner.  Europe can assume the role of communicator between the US and China and not be beholden to either.

Conclusion: The Cost of Inaction
The transatlantic partnership is fractured, variable, and no longer a given, due to American actions. The arrival of the “Donroe Doctrine” and Greenland ultimatum has heralded the near-terminal decline of the rules-based international order. In this context, Taiwan becomes a paradox: the US cannot undermine and threaten its partners and simultaneously call on them to side in the defence of Taiwan. Such actions make European support politically untenable. 

Europe needs to seek emancipation and form its own true role; if it does not, then Taiwan becomes a secondary or tertiary issue lost to the infighting of its allies.

Reference List:
Alperen, Martin J. Foundations of Homeland Security: Law and Policy. 1st ed. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119289142.

Badawi, Habib. “America’s Unilateral Shift: The Evolution of US Foreign Policy from Liberal Hegemony to a Rogue Superpower.” The Review of International Affairs 76, no. 1195 (2025): 367–398. https://doi.org/10.18485/iipe_ria.2025.76.1195.1.

Blockmans, Steven. “Grabbing Greenland – and How It Would Impact NATO and the EU.” CEPS, January 15, 2026. https://www.ceps.eu/grabbing-greenland-and-how-it-would-impact-nato-and-the-eu/.

Brussels Morning. “European Military Makes Bold Shift in Greenland 2026.” World, January 15, 2026. https://brusselsmorning.com/european-military-greenland-2026/91186/.

Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. “What Are the Implications of the US Intervention in Venezuela for Organized Crime?” 2026. Accessed January 17, 2026. https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/what-are-the-implications-of-the-us-intervention-in-venezuela-for-organized-crime/.

Lemaire, Claire. “China-EU Trade up 5% in 2025, despite Disputes.” Brussels Signal, January 8, 2026. https://brusselssignal.eu/2026/01/china-eu-trade-up-5-in-2025-despite-disputes/.

Luyken, Jörg. “What Trump’s Security Doctrine Really Means for Germany.” The German Review, December 17, 2025. https://www.thegermanreview.de/p/what-trumps-security-doctrine-really.

OSW Centre for Eastern Studies. “The Outline of the Merz Doctrine: Germany as a Global Player.” September 9, 2025. https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2025-09-09/outline-merz-doctrine-germany-a-global-player.

Transatlantic Task Force. “The Trump Corollary: A 21st-Century Revival of the Monroe Doctrine.” 2026. Accessed January 18, 2026. https://behorizon.org/the-trump-corollary-a-21st-century-revival-of-the-monroe-doctrine/.

The White House. National Security Strategy of the United States of America. Washington, DC, November 2025. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf.