The illicit trade of narcotics poses a grave threat not only to the health and safety of US citizens, but also to the health and safety of the international community and requires a comprehensive, coordinated, and international prevention strategy. Hundreds of thousands of pounds of illicit drugs like cocaine, methamphetamine, and fentanyl pour through the US’s southern border every year, threatening the security and livelihood of thousands of Americans. Many of the illicit drugs on the market are transported from places like Central and South America, through Mexico and the Caribbean, to the US. This paper recommends that the US reinstate funding for the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement  Affairs to expand law enforcement training and partnerships with Colombia. Strengthening bilateral efforts with Colombia would improve interdiction of narcotics before they reach US borders, reduce corruption and instability in Colombia, and build a foundation for broader cooperation on transnational crime across the Americas.

As the White House Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime (2023) notes, transnational organized crime groups increasingly smuggle synthetic opioids like fentanyl into the US, contributing to tens of thousands of drug-related deaths each year. According to the National Center for Health Statistics (2025), synthetic opioids like fentanyl were the leading cause of approximately 46,144 drug-related deaths in a 12-month period ending in January 2025. Additionally, drugs like cocaine, which are routinely smuggled into the US from Mexico, Central, and South America, have contributed to approximately 22,582 deaths in the same 12- month period (National Center for Health Statistics, 2025). According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC, n.d.), cocaine is typically transported from Colombia to Mexico or Central America by sea and then onwards by land to the United States and Canada. In 2024, US Customs and Border Patrol seized 161,000 pounds of methamphetamine, 30.8 thousand pounds of cocaine, and 21.5 thousand pounds of fentanyl at the Southern border (U.S. Customs and Border Patrol, 2025). 

These numbers showcase the salience of this issue and the necessity of a coordinated response between the United States and Colombia, where 70% to 80% of the world’s cocaine is produced (U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, 2025), cutting off the flow of illicit narcotics at the source. The United States should reinstate funding for the State Department’s Bureau of  International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs to expand law enforcement training and partnerships with Colombia.  

Background

The United States has spent the last century regulating narcotics and combating drug trafficking. Narcotics use was generally accepted in the 19th century, with drugs like morphine, laudanum, and later, cocaine being prescribed by physicians to treat a variety of illnesses (Courtwright, 1992). However, over time, drug use shifted away from domestic use and began being viewed as immoral or deviant. Paired with US involvement in Asia and the growing opium trade, this shift prompted legislative action (Courtwright, 1992). Congress passed the Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914, which sought to add layers of transparency to the drug trade and confine it to legitimate medical channels (Courtwright, 1992). While the Harrison Narcotics Act did not outlaw drug use outright, the Narcotic Drug Import and Export Act of 1922 did. According to Kleiman and Hawdon (2011), the Narcotic Drug Import and Export Act banned the “possession, use, or import of narcotics (primarily cocaine and opium) in any situation other than for medicinal use, established the Federal Narcotics Control Board to enforce the act, and set out mandatory requirements for those foreign countries wishing to import or export narcotics for legitimate purposes from the United States.” 

Other critical pieces of legislation in the fight against drug trafficking include the Boggs Act of 1951 and the Controlled Substances Act of 1970. The Boggs Act established harsh, but uniform, penalties for those who were found in violation of previous anti-drug laws. The Act mandated that those individuals charged and convicted of offenses involving marijuana, cocaine, or opiates be given a $2000 fine for all offenses and receive two to five years in prison for their first offense, five to 10 years for a second, and 10 to 30 years for a third offense (Kleiman & Hawdon, 2011). The Controlled Substances Act (CSA) established much of the legal framework that is used to regulate drugs and substances that pose a risk of abuse and dependence, including the scheduling system in which drugs and substances are categorized based on their medical utility and their potential for abuse and dependence (Lampe, 2025). The CSA also established the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to enforce and implement the provisions of the Act. Today, the DEA maintains offices all over the world with the goal of stopping narcotics bound for the United States by conducting bilateral investigations and intelligence operations (DEA, n.d.). 

In 1988, Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, a landmark piece of anti-drug legislation which established a number of provisions, including the need for a multinational anti-drug trafficking force (Congressional Research Service [CRS], 1988). Additionally, the bill authorizes and provides funding for foreign assistance, particularly international military training and education as it relates to the use of specialized equipment used in narcotics eradication and interdiction in Latin America and the Caribbean (CRS, 1988). As a precursor to these provisions, the Bureau of International Narcotics Matters (INM) was established within the State Department in 1978 with the goal of reducing narcotics trafficking to the US from Latin America (Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs [INL], n.d.). The Bureau was later re-established as the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) in 1995 with an expanded mission focused on combatting transnational crime and corruption internationally (Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs [INL], n.d.). 

The INL has provided necessary military and law enforcement training and funding all over the world. The INL has been involved in the critical anti-narcotics programs across the Americas that are now in jeopardy due to the Trump Administration’s foreign aid funding freezes. According to the Washington Post, several anti-narcotics trafficking projects and programs in Mexico and South America have been suspended (Schmidt et al., 2025). For instance, the Ecuadorian navy planned to begin construction of a new dock for anti-narcotics operations in early 2025, adding much-needed protection to the country’s coastline; however, the project is now on hold (Schmidt et al., 2025). In Mexico, nearly half of the INL contract force has been terminated. Offices that relied on INL funds to train law enforcement officers have been severely impacted by the federal funding freeze, reducing the US’s ability to collaborate with Mexico on anti-narcotics operations (Schmidt et al., 2025) and increasing the likelihood of dangerous illicit substances like fentanyl crossing the southern border. 

Analysis of Solution Option 

Hundreds of thousands of pounds of illicit drugs like cocaine, methamphetamine, and fentanyl pour through the US’s southern border every year, threatening the security and livelihood of thousands of Americans. Many of the illicit drugs on the market are transported from places like Central and South America, through Mexico and the Caribbean, to the US. These manufacturing and transport flows necessitate a key US partnership in the region, stopping the flow of narcotics at the source. The US must reinvest in law enforcement training and military partnerships with Colombia through the INL to prevent this flow. President Trump’s 2024 federal foreign aid freeze has left the future of counter-narcotics partnerships unclear, putting the lives of thousands of Americans at risk. Although some international anti-narcotics funding has been reinstated, like that used for anti-fentanyl programs in Mexico, the future of US collaborations with Colombian military and law enforcement remains uncertain. Historically, challenges to US anti-narcotics smuggling programs have come from those who believe that the US should tighten up its foreign aid budget or those who may consider international programs like those carried out by the State Department and INL to be inefficient. There have been several international responses to narcotics trafficking, particularly through international institutions like Interpol, which, according to former Secretary General of Interpol, Jürgen Stock (2017), “seeks to provide opportunities for training providers and recipients to build contact networks and exchange information about ongoing training initiatives.” Other Interpol operations in the region include Operation Lionfish Hurricane, which ran from April to May 2024 and resulted in the seizure of 615 tons of drugs and precursor chemicals (Hall, 2024). Although operations like this are significant and necessary, the US should not rely on international institutions as its primary method for combatting drug trafficking. Heavy reliance on Interpol may not always suit the US’s interests, as there is a significant lack of trust among members of the organization that may make joint operations difficult. For instance, Naim (2012) mentions that issues such as corruption contribute to this lack of trust, as law enforcement agencies are often hesitant to share their best, most delicate information with agencies that may abuse it. 

Instead of strictly operating within organizations like Interpol, the US should opt to engage in bilateral operations and law enforcement training in Colombia. Although past US efforts to collaborate with the Colombian government and law enforcement agencies have yielded mixed results, learning from this past, new programs have potential for success. In 2000, the US signed Plan Colombia into law, a bilateral agreement with three primary aims: “ending illegal drug production and trafficking, promoting economic and social development, and funding and training the Colombian military” (Roy, n.d.). Over the course of 13 years, Colombia reduced its coca cultivation from 160,000 hectares to 48,000 (Mejía, 2016). The estimated value of Colombia’s illicit economy shrank from $7.5 billion to $4.5 billion in the same timeframe (Mejía, 2016). While the Plan was initially successful in reducing narcotics production and trafficking, there are some questions as to the efficacy of the Plan, since Colombia’s cocaine production ballooned after 2013. However, the rebound of Colombia’s cocaine production may have more to do with political will in Colombia than with the US. Since 2008, Colombia has reduced its budget for manual and aerial coca eradication by two-thirds (DEA, 2016). Additionally, the country lessened eradication operations in areas controlled by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in an effort to reduce the risk of armed conflict during the 2014 peace negotiations (DEA, 2016). There has also been difficulty in creating an environment that incentivizes farmers in coca-producing regions to cultivate legal crops, as Colombia has struggled to effectively implement alternative livelihood programs in these regions (Mejía, 2016). 

However, the US could remedy these issues through diplomacy and careful planning. The United States should utilize every diplomatic effort to move the political will in Colombia, engaging in negotiations to ensure the needs of both the US and Colombia are being met. In these negotiations, the US should highlight the ways in which US-Colombia partnerships will benefit the country. Pointing out how decreasing the country’s reliance on illicit drug smuggling will increase stability across the region, creating a more secure environment overall. The US should work with Colombia to ensure the effective implementation of alternative livelihood programs that not only give farmers access to legal crops but also a market for those goods. With this in mind, the US and Colombia could work with US agricultural companies to promote foreign direct investment (FDI) in these regions. This will allow farmers access to legal markets for their goods and funds to make coca production less attractive. 

The counterargument to reinstating INL aid to Colombia is the expense, and claims that the programs are inefficient. A cited 2018 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report to support this argument found “The US government has invested over $10 billion in counternarcotics and security efforts in Colombia since 1999. Security has improved, but cocaine production has more than tripled from 2013 through 2017.” However, this report fails to consider Colombia’s political environment since 2013 and the reason why cocaine production increased. The report blames the State Department for the increase in cocaine production. However, Colombia’s slashing of its eradication budget and desire for peace with FARC have played a major role in the country’s ballooning cocaine production. Additionally, the $10 billion dollar price tag that GAO references is the amount of money the US has spent over the course of 18 years. In reality, this equates to approximately $556 million annually, a mere sliver of the INL’s annual budget of $1.4 billion in 2014 (Inspector General of the United States Department of State, 2014). GAO (2018) also found that the State Department failed to evaluate the effectiveness of its counternarcotics programs, making it difficult to determine the best course of action regarding the various tools and techniques the State Department ought to employ in counternarcotics programs and operations. 

Halting all aid to the State Department’s counternarcotics programs is like throwing the baby out with the bathwater. Instead of viewing these reports as a sign that the programs should be scrapped, the State Department should be given a chance to highlight their necessity. The State Department should conduct an annual review of its counternarcotics programs and operations to ensure effectiveness and that American dollars are being spent on tools and techniques that will efficiently stop narcotics from reaching US soil. New programs should be modeled after the US’s most successful counternarcotics operations, such as those conducted by the US Coast Guard and Joint Interagency Task Force South in collaboration with international partners. For example, in late 2014, the Coast Guard Cutter Hamilton’s crew interdicted 16,100 pounds of cocaine, worth about $182.8 million, in the Caribbean and the Eastern Pacific Ocean off the coast of Central and South America (United States Coast Guard News, 2024). These operations require significant interagency coordination, relying on tools such as patrol aircraft used to detect suspicious vessels in the water and Coast Guard vessels, like Cutter Hamilton, used to interdict the narcotics. As such, the State Department, in collaboration with the Colombian military, should carry out a pilot operation with a minimal yet effective operating budget. This mission should be used as a tool showcasing the necessity and efficacy of the State Department’s military collaboration in counternarcotic matters. 

Policy Recommendations 

The United States should reinstate funding for the State  Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs to expand law enforcement training and military partnerships with Colombia. Strengthening these bilateral efforts would improve interdiction of narcotics before they reach US borders, reduce corruption and instability in Colombia, and build a foundation for broader cooperation on transnational crime across the Americas.  

Since the US increased its involvement with Colombia in the late 1990s and early 2000s,  the country has shed its reputation for internal violence and has become an exporter of security expertise. According to Hochmüller and Müller (2025), “Colombia has increasingly been regarded as an exemplary case of security achievements ‘made in the Global South’ in interconnected domains such as counterinsurgency, stabilisation, peacebuilding, demobilisation,  anti-drug policing, and counterterrorism.” Hochmüller and Müller (2025) additionally note that  Colombia has overtaken the position of the US as the primary police and military trainer in the region, becoming a model for many South American and Caribbean states such as Costa Rica,  Ecuador, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, and Peru. The US must reinstate funding to INL and continue to pursue counternarcotics partnerships with Colombia to extend it’s reach and influence. Doing so will allow the US to continue to support high standards and professionalism in Colombian law enforcement and military through training and joint action, thereby reducing corruption and instability not only within Colombia, but across the region. 

With funding reinstated, with integrated evaluation and review, the State Department can develop innovative programs specifically targeting drug production and interdiction. Although security in Colombia has increased over the years, the country remains the largest producer of cocaine, with production levels more than tripling from 2013 to 2017 (GAO, 2018). New INL  programs focused on training law enforcement officers in new tools and methods for the eradication of production facilities and narcotics interdiction will help lower production levels and stop the flow of narcotics before they reach US borders.

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