Executive Summary

This policy brief examines how the European Union should approach relations with Russia after the end of the war in Ukraine. It argues that while Russia may emerge from the conflict claiming victory, the war will leave the country significantly weakened economically, militarily, and socially. The paper recommends that the EU pursue a balanced strategy that combines deterrence of future Russian aggression with the gradual reintegration of Russia into the international community to support long-term European stability.

 Ideological Factors that Lead to the War

Nationalism

Due to the failed democracy movement in the 90s, this form of governance has negative connotations in Russia. The economic instability, political chaos, and perceived loss of global standing during this time period contributed to a widespread belief that democracy brought weakness rather than prosperity. As such, this placed Russia at odds with the Ukrainian democracy movement. Therefore, after the Maidan revolution and the annexation of the Crimean peninsula, Russia began looking back on World War Two in order to provide a solid base to its own political and cultural values. Russia has spent extensive time focusing on the achievements of World War Two. At the time, the country focused on themes of sacrifice and resilience, national pride and unity in order to triumph over Nazi Germany. Those themes are now reused by the Kremlin in its war against Ukraine. Additionally, Putin stated that Ukraine is not a sovereign country and that it is brainwashed into believing it has friendly relations with the West (Karaschuk and Rostovetska, 2023). 

Geopolitical Claims

It should be noted that Russia does not view its acts of aggression against its neighbours as a form of colonization (as would be typical in the West). From the former’s perspective, the Slavic countries lost their national identity under Mongolian rule and, with it, their special connection to Russia. Additionally, Russia considers that external actors such as Austria-Hungary, Poland, and the EU used Ukraine to divide the country. Furthermore, narratives about internal divisions within Ukraine, and claims of extremist elements, are utilized to frame Russian actions as being acts of liberation and protection. Putin claims that the only way to undo Ukraine’s Western influence and to save it from internal divisions is to coerce it into "fraternal relations". This is framed as a mandatory step for restoring stability and “correcting” the West’s perceived encroachment upon Ukraine’s rightful place beside Russia. (Reid, 2022).

The Military Performance of the Russian Army

Losses

The CSIS (Center for Strategic & International Studies) estimates that between February 2022 and December 2025 Russian forces suffered nearly 1.2 million casualties (which entails killed, wounded, or missing). It has resulted in Russia having to shorten its military training to a basic minimum in order to shore up the line. In 2025 alone, Russia is estimated to have suffered about 415,000 casualties, or about 35,000 casualties per month (Jones and McCabe, 2026). To put this into perspective, this would make the war in Ukraine far deadlier than the 15,00 fatalities Russia suffered during the Afghanistan war (1979–1989), as well as the 8,000 losses in the two Chechen wars (1994–1996 and 1999–2000). In other words, the war in Ukraine seems to be, for both Russia and Ukraine, the deadliest war since the Second World War. It is expected that these losses will increase as the war continues (Kobak et al, 2025). 

Aftermath of the War in Ukraine

Narrative of the Russian Government

In the event that Russia successfully negotiates to keep its currently annexed territories, this will be against the backdrop of an incredibly high death toll. As a result, the significance of the territorial gains over the “Ukrainian Nazis” remains questionable. Nevertheless, this will be positioned as an ideological and spiritual focal point, and a fulfillment of Russia’s war aims. The Russian government will present the victory over Ukraine as a successful defence against nationalism, as well as a triumph against evil, akin to the victory over the Nazis. It is therefore expected that Russia will glorify this war similarly to World War Two. It must be mentioned that the ideological factors that lead Russia to invade Ukraine will still be present with the country. As outlined within the first section of this policy paper, Russia will continue to expand its political, societal and economic influence over Eastern Europe (Geri, 2024). Additionally, it should also be mentioned that the people living in these annexed Ukrainian territories will not easily accept the new Russian authorities and will thus engage in a prolonged armed resistance. In this vein, Russia’s new territories will incur additional military and economic costs. This means that these new territories will function as obstacles in Russia’s road to full economic recovery in addition to the reluctance of the EU and Ukraine to loosen their sanctions against Russia. Ultimately, by the time a settlement to the war is negotiated, and even if Russia gets to keep its annexed territories, the country, overall, will have lost more than it gained. This will be further exacerbated by its increased global isolation due to losing its allies in Syria, Mali, and Venezuela (Korejba, 2025).  

Societal Impact

According to Mathers and Danilova, when Russia began its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, it was anticipated that the soldiers' mothers and wives would stage public protests, opposing the war, and demanding the return of their sons (similar to the first Chechin War). However, the government has taken several measures to silence these voices, such as expanding military family benefits and implementing police visits. In tandem with harsher crackdowns on broader opposition to the war, this protest movement lost the majority of its momentum. Nevertheless, the wives of Russian soldiers continue to speak out against the lack of information regarding their loved ones. These protestors have emerged as one of the most prominent outlets of open criticism of the state’s handling of Russia’s war in Ukraine. However, it should be mentioned that not all of the wives are unified in their criticism of the Russian government or that their opposition to the war translates into support for Ukraine. An example of this would be the telegram group The Way Home. On the one hand, the group called for an end to the mobilisation of civilians. On the other hand, it holds a nationalistic ideology, explicitly rejecting sympathy for the Ukrainian people, and distancing themselves from migrants, non-Russian soldiers and prisoners. This suggests that these different nationalistic views will still find acceptance after the war’s conclusion (Mathers and Danilova, 2024).

Historical Parallels

The End of the Soviet Era

 The Soviet Afghanistan War initiated what is known in Russia as the “Era of Stagnation”. Authoritarian regimes cannot survive long without economic prosperity, strong ideology, and fear of the government (all three of which were in decline) (Gromek-Broc, Zherebov, Damme, Karinge, 2024). Russia suffered from the trauma of the aforementioned war (similarly to the war in Ukraine). As previously stated, after the war, both the EU and Ukraine will be reluctant to loosen their sanction against Russia. As a result of this, the shadow economy–controlled by the Russian oligarchs and the mafia–will see a rise in demand from ordinary citizens. This in turn would furthering corruption. Due to the aforementioned economic hardships, Russian women and veterans are more inclined to challenge the narrative of the Russian government. The former is more likely to speak out against the government’s treatment of their husbands and sons. The latter would become more vocal about their treatment at the front, given the previously mentioned reckless tactics and high loss of life. Additionally, during the Afghanistan War, the shadow economy eventually reached the same volume as its legal counterpart. Many resources were still being routed towards a largely meaningless confrontation with the West (similar to Russia’s hybrid war against Europe). This led to a spike in corruption that drove the Soviet Union towards economic and social ruin (Gromek-Broc, Zherebov, Damme, Karinge, 2024). 

The Weimar Republic

 Therefore, Russia itself will emerge more fragile than it did before the war. On top of that, its allied regimes in Mali, Syria and Venezuela (and lately after the lost election of Orbán in Hungary) have been ousted, and the regions surrounding its border (Chechnya and its annexed regions of Ukraine) remain as fragile as ever. There is also the possibility that this will keep Russia isolated, leading to its radicalisation. Viewed from this angle, the situation bears a resemblance to Germany during the interwar period, during which the perceived humiliation by the treaty of Versailles gave way to Nazi Germany. Additionally, due to inadequate support, veterans of the great war brought violence to the fragile social order of the Weimar Republic. Similarly, given that the Russian government will struggle to sell the limited achievements of the war in Ukraine as a justifiable cause, many veterans will struggle to reconcile with the incompetence of their government in handling the war. Simultaneously, this sense of betrayal, in tandem with economic stagnation, could foster social discontent that manifests in national extremism (Wu, 2024).

Policy Recommendation

According to Johan Galtung’s Theory of Conflict, there are several approaches to resolving conflicts. Relevant to this policy essay are the approaches of compromise and deepening, which are intended to make goals more compatible with reality, or reshaping reality, as to enable conflicting goals to coexist alongside one another. 

Two approaches the EU should consider for solving the conflict, compromise and deepening

In the first approach, compromise, Russia and Ukraine reduce or modify some of their demands, in order to reach a mutually acceptable outcome. Rather than seeking maximalist demands, compromise emphasizes concession, and balance. This method is often utilized in political and diplomatic contexts, given its ability to reduce tensions, and create practical short-term solutions. However, this also means that underlying grievances are left unresolved, if the parties feel that they have sacrificed too much or if inequalities remain unaddressed. The short-term solution to the war in Ukraine entails freezing the conflict along the current lines of contact. This enables Putin to ease the pressure on the Russian economy (large sectors of the economy no longer have to be dedicated to the war effort). As well as loosening societal restrictions (such as lifting the ban on large parts of the internet). This allows Putin to stabilize his regime, and proclaim that all objectives of the war have been achieved. A stabilized Russia will ensure that a situation akin to the Weimar Republic is avoided (Galtung and Nicholson, 1974). 

The second approach, deepening, seeks to address the underlying causes of the conflict rather than merely its explicit symptoms. Through dialogue and critical reflection, this approach attempts to reach solutions that deeply satisfies all sides, and thus aims to find sustainable long-term solutions. Deepening involves exploring the deeper needs, fears, identities, and interests of the actors involved.  

As such, this policy paper recommends that the EU and Ukraine consider Russia’s nationalism and precarious situation when crafting a foreign policy towards Russia after the war in Ukraine. Simultaneously, this policy paper argues that the western countries should refrain from keeping Russia isolated indefinitely. There is a pressing need to factor in both Ukrainian and Russian stability concerns to ensure long-term regional stability. This requires Western policy makers to remain adaptable to potential reformist or nationalistic shifts. This is important, given the current radical changes that the European security architecture is (already) experiencing. Therefore, it is paramount that the EU remains committed to Ukraine’s economic recovery, in order to discourage potential nationalistic shifts. Simultaneously, the EU and Ukraine must also deter any forms of Russian aggression in order to dissuade any reformist or nationalist shifts. This can be furthered with the slow reintegration of Russia into the international community. This would help avoid a situation akin to Germany during the interwar period. Therefore, this paper’s policy proposal adds to the long-term viability of the newly emerging European security architecture (Galtung and Nicholson, 1974).

References

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Gromek-Broc, Katarzyna, Vladimir Zherebov, Sam Van Damme, and Sarah Karinge. 2024. “WHAT NEXT? THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY AFTER THE UKRAINE WAR AND THE NEW BALANCE OF WORLD POWER.” Il Politico 89, no. 1(260): 5–40. https://www.jstor.org/stable/48795093.

Jones, Seth G., and Riley McCabe. 2026. “Russia’s Grinding War in Ukraine: Massive Losses and Tiny Gains for a Declining Power.” CSIS Briefs. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. January.

KARASCHUK, ANDRIY, and TATIANA ROSTOVETSKA. 2023. “Cultural and National Patterns in the Military Propaganda Campaign of Russia and Ukraine.” Rivista Di Studi Politici Internazionali 90, no. 4 (360): 589–98. https://www.jstor.org/stable/27319373.

Kobak, Dmitry, Alexey Bessudnov, Alexander Ershov, Tatiana Mikhailova, and Alexey Raksha. 2025. “War Fatalities in Russia in 2022–2023 Estimated via Excess Male Mortality: A Research Note.”
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Korejba, Jakub. 2025. “The New Iron Curtain: Post-War Ukraine and Its Position in the Emerging Regional Order.” Horizons: Journal of International Relations and Sustainable Development, no. 29: 116–25. https://www.jstor.org/stable/48829714.

Mathers, Jennifer, and Natasha Danilova. 2024. “Ukraine War: Russian soldiers’ wives are increasingly
outspoken in their opposition”. The Conversation. March 7, 1–4. https://doi.org/10.64628/ab.qdcnekjyk. 

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