NATO's Shield: Countering Disinformation on Defense Investment

Introduction

In recent international dynamics, Russia’s use of disinformation has been growing in effectiveness and is now perceived as a vastly complex threat to NATO. It is not a stretch, by any means, to speak of information warfare regarding Russia’s practice in spreading false or misleading narratives in our modern world. If NATO is to tackle effectively and comprehensively its current security concerns, it must urgently address the Russian disinformation threat. The defense alliance has recently pushed for its member states to increase defense investments. These developments have been motivated by short- and long-term concerns. In the short term, bolstering European defense capabilities is a necessary step to continue supporting Ukraine in the war against Russia’s invasion of its territories. However, beyond this aspect, internal dynamics in the defense alliance suggest that the EU has been overly dependent on the US for defense and security. Hence, in a more strategic longer-term perspective aiming at building its resilience, defense spending in EU member states has been on the rise. With NATO now gradually reinforcing its defense capabilities, among the many existing challenges, widespread disinformation on defense spending – mostly spread by Russia - persists as a major problem in the process of gaining public support for these new policies. It is already challenging for governments to convince their electorate to support increased defense spending, and the disinformation targeting European public opinion clearly adds layers of complexity. If NATO is to maintain the strategic advantage for which it invests, governments can hardly be completely transparent on their defense spending in the media, and thus the window of opportunity for disinformation remains, and is promptly exploited by Russia. This brief will address the question: How to counter disinformation on the distribution of defense investments across the NATO alliance? First, it will unpack the Russian disinformation threat, looking at its most common targets and employed style of narratives. Second, it will cover relevant policy developments in this field. Third, it explores some of the key developments related to the impact of emerging technologies in disinformation. Finally, a set of specific recommendations will be proposed for counter-disinformation policies tailored to the NATO alliance.

Peculiarities of Russia’s information warfare: target analysis, and narrative recognition.

In the Kremlin, the belief that Russia is a victim of Western wrongdoings is very strong (Kuzio, T. 2017). According to the Russian Levada Centre, less than 20% of the Russian population disagrees with such a view of western influence projection (Kuzio, T. 2017). Vladimir Putin is very keen on narrating the idea that the dismantlement of the USSR is a process that western allies want to conclude by eliminating Russia. In analyzing the construction of such narratives, the study of political communication and propaganda hints at several trends and methods employed. The creation of binary oppositions, so-called ‘us vs them’ narratives, is a recurrent tool utilized to prime public audiences on the need for defensive action through the use of force. Additionally, Putin’s side of the story often includes false or clinically manipulated information to feed this cause. For instance, in the early stages of the conflict in Ukraine, he brought up multiple times a ridiculous claim that Ukraine was in need of protection against the threat composed of neo-Nazi groups inside the country, all of which was used to justify the invasion (France 24. 2023, January 27). All the above considerations make up some of the core arguments of Russia’s justification for its invasion of Ukraine, but what is most concerning here is that these narratives are only the tip of the iceberg. Russia’s information warfare takes a complex multiplicity of forms, yet some common methods, narratives, and targeted information can be identified. An interesting analysis of the Russian disinformation campaign published in 2019 suggests it being organized around a ‘system of cascading narratives’ which effectively allows for different narratives to coexist and reinforce one another (BOKŠA, M. 2019). On top of this, there seems to be an apparent trend for such narratives to be applied to specific geographical contexts. For example, Russia streamlines a specific narrative for geographical areas featuring Russian-speaking communities. Alternatively, ‘anti-western’ narratives are often spread in EU member states, and specifically tailored to trigger skepticism from far-right governments (BOKŠA, M. 2019). In the context of defense investments and defense capacity building, disinformation, or misinformation – the line between these two is at times extremely thin – can effectively reduce the public trust embedded in defense policies. The pro-Russia bioweapons and biolabs disinformation/misinformation campaign is a good example of a series of false and carefully manipulated information aimed at destroying the credibility of western values (EUvsDisinfo. n.d.). This campaign goes so far as to propose that the Coronavirus was an American engineered bioweapon.

Critical policy concerns and developments.

“The more insidious danger” that Russian disinformation can bring to NATO is “the damage they can do to citizens’ faith in the institutions of democratic governance and resources of public information and discussion” (Johns Hopkins University. 2021). It is of utmost complexity for NATO allies to counter disinformation for two main reasons: firstly, the current advancement of communication technologies has produced an unprecedented revolution in the speed at which a piece of information can spread in the media. Furthermore, social media and other digital communication platforms are accessible by a very wide share of the population, making the threat of disinformation even more unpredictable. The second reason is that eliminating online information on the basis that it is false or misleading can potentially be perceived in societies as unduly imposed restrictions of the free flow of ideas. Ultimately, this situation can bring undesirable effects on the degree of public trust embedded in democratic institutions of governance. The EU put a growing focus on disinformation in the last few years. In 2018, the European Commission published a code of practice on disinformation. In 2022, the revised version of this code gathered more than 40 signatories including big data companies such as Google, Meta, Microsoft, Adobe, TikTok, and others. The code engages signatories to commit to different practices to counter disinformation such as ensuring the transparency of political messaging, and bolstering cooperation with international fact checkers (The 2022 Code of Practice on Disinformation. 2024). Another important aspect of this EU initiative is the emphasis on empowering users in their ability to identify disinformation online. Often, disinformation triggers emotional reactions that can cloud the perception of users and can further accelerate its spread (Johns Hopkins University. 2021). In July 2022, the Council of the EU also adopted some political conclusions on Foreign Information, Manipulation and Interference (FIMI), along with a set of tools to strengthen the ability to detect and respond to these threats, with a strong focus to counter the false Russian narrative and manipulation of information (Council conclusions on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI), 2022). The US government, among its many activities in disinformation policies, has been publishing in-depth reports to expose and debunk Russian disinformation narratives. It also actively collaborates – including within NATO, in the G7 context and other multilateral fora - with involved stakeholders in the information ecology and promotes the importance of truth and fact-based information over emotionally driven chains of reaction in the digital media (Disarming disinformation - United States Department of State. 2024). Last but not least, coming to NATO itself, the Alliance has been dealing with the challenge of disinformation since its creation in 1949 and has been actively countering a significant increase in hostile information activities since Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea from Ukraine in 2014. Including its disinformation center, NATO’s approach to countering disinformation is based on two key functions: Understand and Engage. NATO continuously analyses the information environment in order to understand what people are saying, hearing and reading about NATO and key topics related to its work. Based on this understanding, the Alliance engages with audiences through various channels, providing accurate information in its public communications (Nato. n.d.).

The importance of technological advancement in the fight against disinformation.

There are many ways in which governments can invest their resources to combat disinformation. Artificial intelligence is arguably one of the most groundbreaking technological breakthroughs of the last century. Its use in military warfare has been gradually applied mainly in the development of advanced weapons or other military capabilities. The potential of such technologies in dealing with large quantities of data is creating new approaches to debunking disinformation. Some key findings show that the spread of disinformation happens primarily through the use of narratives that can effectively trigger strong emotions from online users, such as the emotion of surprise or revulsion, rather than calmer emotions like sadness or trust. By using artificial intelligence, it is possible to train computers to track rapidly spreading messages based on the emotional language with which it is employed, or also to detect manipulation of images aiming at projecting a false or distorted reality. Although the total elimination of disinformation is virtually impossible, the faster it is identified, the more options are open to slow it down (Johns Hopkins University. 2021). With the financial support of the Center for Industrial Technological Development (CDTI), Europa Press and an entity named AyGLOO have created a research and development project aimed at understanding the potential use of artificial intelligence to detect disinformation online. This project aims at developing an artificial intelligence-based disinformation detection tool for journalists and media practitioners (Telefónica. 2023, March 17). On the other hand, unfortunately, artificial intelligence can also be used to create content, and therefore it can be an alarmingly effective instrument contributing to the evolution of disinformation. In this respect, a voluntary code of conduct for artificial intelligence appears to be in the works and is jointly being developed by the EU and the US (AP News. 2023). This code pushes big media companies to identify and label AI-generated content in the media.

Recommendations:

To tackle disinformation, especially in the context of increasing defense investments, we strongly encourage NATO allies to consider the following recommendations:

- Establish and promote sound and comprehensive ethical guidelines for digital media platform usage:

It remains utterly important to establish specific delimitations on the content that is produced on digital platforms. This provision can help NATO allies to be proactive rather than reactive in monitoring social media usage and the spread of disinformation. If established on common grounds, this can speed up the process of debunking false narratives based on clear ethical principles established jointly by all NATO allies.

- Coordinating international cooperation:

It is crucial that NATO member states continue their efforts in intelligence sharing, media monitoring and analysis. This includes strengthening cooperation not only among member states, but also with international partners such as NGO’s, large data companies, academic networks, and others. A better-coordinated basis for international cooperation can help the alliance in benefitting from additional external resources, as well as establish stronger international networks of awareness in the fight against disinformation. Coordination with the EU and other appropriate international and multilateral fora is also paramount.

- Harnessing emerging technologies:

Emerging technologies, especially artificial intelligence, propose new and promising approaches to increasing the speed at which disinformation can be identified and slowed down. In this respect, it is recommendable that NATO allies devote available resources to research and development with the aim of maximizing the effectiveness and potential use of emerging technologies to fight disinformation.

- Promote critical thinking in media literacy:

Building a resilient society in matters of media literacy is a crucial prospect for NATO allies. It is recommended that member states invest resources in media literacy programs, and integrate such aspects in public institutions, such as schools, universities, community centers, and others. Promoting media literacy can constitute a significant helping hand in generating public trust by making individuals and communities better educated on the threat composed by disinformation.

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