Executive Summary 

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is strengthening deterrence in the Arctic, but military readiness also depends on resilient civilian infrastructure. Growing maritime activity and dependence on external finance, technology, and logistics connect defence planning to economic security. This brief argues that transatlantic partners should connect military preparedness with infrastructure policy while preserving local decision-making. It recommends integrating maritime resilience into Arctic exercises, coordinating assessments of critical infrastructure dependencies, and involving local and Indigenous communities in investment decisions. The objective is to make deterrence sustainable through reliable civilian services and legitimate development choices. 

Analysis of Current Policy 

The Arctic is no longer a remote and secondary security area. As climate change makes the region more accessible, maritime trade, energy transportation, critical minerals, data infrastructure, and great power competition are converging in the same geography. With the membership of Finland and Sweden, seven out of the eight Arctic states are now part of NATO (NATO 2026a). NATO is working to increase military awareness in the High North through initiatives such as Arctic Sentry and Task Force X-Arctic. However, the growing security challenge is not solely military. While the Alliance strengthens deterrence, the ownership and operation of civilian infrastructure also require attention. 

This situation creates a security vulnerability for NATO. The Alliance can deter military attack, monitor airspace, track submarine activity, and protect supply lines. However, it cannot single-handedly determine which capital will finance a port, who will operate critical mineral projects, or which technology data infrastructure will rely on. These decisions involve national governments, regulators, investors, and local authorities (Khorrami 2026). Can NATO’s military deterrence be complemented by transatlantic economic resilience? 

Maritime Activity and Operational Vulnerability 

The first indicator of change is maritime traffic. According to data from the Arctic Council’s Working Group on the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME), the number of unique vessels entering the Arctic Polar Code area increased by 40 per cent between 2013 and 2025 (Cook 2026). During the same period, total distance sailed nearly doubled, rising from 6.1 million to 11.9 million nautical miles (Cook 2026). These figures cover all vessel activity in the defined area, rather than only commercial transits between oceans. They nevertheless show that the region is becoming a more heavily used maritime area. 

However, more ships do not automatically mean greater security. Navigation safety, search and rescue, ice forecasting, port infrastructure, and environmental protection become even more critical. As sea ice recedes, operational uncertainty does not disappear. Adverse weather, shifting ice, weak communications, and limited emergency response capabilities continue to make maritime activities vulnerable. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) identifies inadequate navigational and communication systems, harsh weather, and the difficulty of rescue operations as persistent polar shipping risks (IMO n.d.). The opening of the Arctic does not mean that a safe and stable maritime order will emerge on its own. 

Military Deterrence and Civilian Dependencies 

NATO is increasing its military presence in this environment. Launched in February 2026, Arctic Sentry brings Allied activities together under Joint Force Command Norfolk within a more coherent operational approach (NATO 2026c). Task Force X-Arctic, launched in June 2026, is testing networked uncrewed systems and data sharing to strengthen situational awareness. It remains an experimentation programme, with a full-scale demonstration planned for summer 2027 (NATO 2026b). 

This military transformation is necessary. Russia’s military activity in the region and growing cooperation with China are direct security concerns for NATO (NATO 2026a). Finland and Sweden’s accession has strengthened the defence architecture of Northern Europe. The North Atlantic, the Baltic, the Nordic region, and the Arctic have long been interconnected security spaces. Their closer integration within NATO increases the importance of planning across them. A crisis in one region can affect reinforcement and supply routes in another. Greater surveillance, preparedness, and joint operational capabilities in the north are therefore rational priorities. 

NATO already recognises that civilian transport, communications, and energy supplies enable military operations. Its resilience framework includes requirements for essential services and civil support to the military, alongside cooperation with the European Union (EU) on critical infrastructure (NATO 2026d). The argument here is to connect these existing commitments more closely to Arctic investment decisions and regional operational conditions. It does not require NATO to become an investment regulator. 

Economic Sovereignty and Infrastructure Control 

Security competition also operates below the threshold of armed conflict. Port investments, mining projects, telecommunications infrastructure, energy facilities, and shipbuilding capacity have strategic value. Khorrami’s assessment highlights why Nordic Arctic security requires attention to economic dependencies and infrastructure resilience alongside military deterrence (Khorrami 2026). 

Sovereignty concerns legal authority. The issue here is how economic dependence can constrain the practical exercise of that authority. A state may legally control Arctic territory. However, if a critical port depends on a single external financier, data infrastructure on an external supplier, or an energy system on one commercial actor, its options in a crisis may be limited. This is a gap between legal authority and practical control over essential services. Foreign investment is not inherently a security threat. Vulnerability depends on contractual safeguards, substitutability, and the consequences of disruption. 

China’s maritime capabilities make this debate more significant. In testimony published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Matthew P. Funaiole reports that China’s share of global shipbuilding output rose from less than 5 per cent in 2000 to more than 53 per cent in 2025 (Funaiole 2026). He also identifies liquefied natural gas (LNG) carriers, icebreakers, research and support vessels, and autonomous technologies as strategic segments for allied industrial investment (Funaiole 2026). These global figures do not measure Chinese Arctic control. Their relevance is that industrial capacity matters alongside military presence. Effective Arctic operations require vessels, maintenance facilities, data, and logistics networks. 

For this reason, Arctic defence planning must account for economic security. Control of critical ports, undersea cables, fuelling points, and satellite communications affects military mobility. In a crisis, forces depend on civilian infrastructure as well as military bases (NATO 2026d). The policy challenge is to translate this dependence into concrete continuity arrangements before disruption occurs. 

Local Communities and Legitimate Development 

Local and Indigenous communities must be participants in these decisions. A port, communications link, or energy facility may support both defence and everyday services. Security restrictions should therefore be assessed alongside their effects on local development. The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples provides an important standard for consultation through Indigenous peoples’ representative institutions and for obtaining free, prior and informed consent in the circumstances addressed by Articles 19 and 32 (United Nations General Assembly 2007, arts. 19, 32). Arctic infrastructure policy should follow these principles and applicable domestic requirements. Communities should help define priorities, assess environmental impacts, and negotiate benefits. If external actors restrict investment on security grounds, they should identify credible alternatives that preserve access to essential services. Otherwise, resilience policy risks weakening the local legitimacy on which its implementation depends. 

Policy Recommendations 

1. Integrate maritime resilience into Arctic defence planning. NATO and national civil preparedness authorities should test port access, communications, fuel replenishment, and emergency response alongside military readiness. Exercises should include civilian operators and scenarios involving service interruption. The existing resilience framework provides a starting point (NATO 2026d). Initial assessments should identify alternative supply routes, responsible operators, and recovery times for essential services. 

2. Coordinate assessments of critical Arctic infrastructure. All Allies should be able to contribute, with Arctic Allies leading because they host the relevant territory and infrastructure. Canada, the United States, and the Nordic countries bring direct regional responsibilities. The EU should participate within its investment, regulatory, and financing competences. Building on existing NATO–EU cooperation, this process should connect defence requirements with national investment decisions, assess supplier concentration and contractual access, and avoid duplicating screening authorities. Its first output should be a shared assessment of dependencies and feasible alternatives. 

3. Make local and Indigenous participation a condition of legitimate implementation. National and regional authorities should involve affected communities before project approval or security restrictions are decided, following applicable rights and consultation requirements. Infrastructure plans should specify benefits for civilian services, environmental safeguards, and channels for addressing concerns. Progress should be assessed through participation in decisions and agreed local outcomes, as well as operational readiness. 

Arctic security is a transatlantic test. NATO can deter military aggression. Making that deterrence sustainable depends on maritime resilience, infrastructure investment, and the practical capacity to maintain essential services. Security in the High North will be shaped by both military preparedness and the commercial and technological infrastructure that supports it. 

References

Cook, Jessica. 2026. “Arctic Shipping Update: 40% Increase in Ships in the Arctic.” Arctic Council, February 12. https://arctic-council.org/news/increase-in-arctic-shipping/ 

Funaiole, Matthew P. 2026. “Charting a New Course: Countering China’s Dominance in Global Shipbuilding.” Congressional testimony. Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 22. https://www.csis.org/analysis/charting-new-course-countering-chinas-dominance-global-shipbuilding 

International Maritime Organization (IMO). n.d. “International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code).” Accessed November 5, 2026. https://www.imo.org/en/ourwork/safety/pages/polar-code.aspx 

Khorrami, Nima. 2026. “Sovereignty Below the Threshold: Why Arctic Security Demands a Nordic Economic Strategy.” The Arctic Institute, August 6. https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/sovereignty-below-threshold-why-arctic-security-demands-nordic-economic-strategy/ 

NATO. 2026a. “Arctic Security.” Updated July 24. https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/deterrence-and-defence/arctic-security 

NATO. 2026b. “NATO Launches Task Force X-Arctic to Strengthen Awareness in the Arctic and the High North.” June 6. https://www.nato.int/en/news-and-events/articles/news/2026/06/06/nato-launches-task-force-x-arctic-to-strengthen-awareness-in-the-arctic-and-the-high-north  

NATO. 2026c. “NATO Secretary General Outlines New Activity-Arctic Sentry-ahead of Defence Ministers Meeting.” February 11. https://www.nato.int/en/news-and-events/articles/news/2026/02/11/nato-secretary-general-outlines-new-activity-arctic-sentry-ahead-of-defence-ministers-meeting  

NATO. 2026d. “Resilience, Civil Preparedness and Article 3.” Updated September 18. https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/deterrence-and-defence/resilience-civil-preparedness-and-article-3 

United Nations General Assembly. 2007. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. A/RES/61/295, September 13. https://mandates.un.org/mandate/A/RES/61/295