Frozen Frontline: Building NATO's Defenses to Counter the New Arctic Threat

Background/The Fragmenting Arctic

Climate change is driving a new era of competition and opportunity in the Arctic. Melting permafrost and changing sea conditions are creating new international shipping routes. These changes also make it easier to access large natural resource reserves, which are estimated to hold between 13% and 30% of the world's undiscovered hydrocarbons (Greaves 2019, 5). The effects of climate change, felt worldwide, are most acutely experienced in the Arctic region. Over the past decades, climate change has caused warming at twice the rate of the global average (Koenigk et al. 2020, 673). The rapidly changing climate brings dramatic shifts in sea ice levels, thawing permafrost, altered water systems, reduced snow cover, and a host of challenges that threaten plant and animal populations (Bergman Rosamond 2011, 37-38; Greaves 2019, 4; Koenigk et al. 2020, 674). Beyond these issues, climate change’s role in creating access to shipping lanes, fisheries, minerals, and undiscovered hydrocarbons is shaping the ongoing commodification and marketization of the Arctic. This process is increasing its geopolitical importance as various players compete to define its past, present, and future geographies (Bruun and Medby 2014, 923; Greaves 2019, 5).

As access to these vast deposits of resources has become easier, and the prospect of profit associated with them has increased, it has created disagreement between previously collaborative Arctic countries and outsiders, such as China, which is willing to assert its interest in the region. (Spohr et al., 2013, p.29). The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has only exacerbated concerns over the region, as Russia possesses the most developed Arctic military infrastructure. This, combined with their political ties with China and its interest in the region, is cause for concern as it “indicates a return to great power competition that has led some commentators to anticipate Russian military expansionist tendencies in the Arctic” (Lackenbauer and Lajeunesse, 2016, p.21).

Alongside their established military presence in the region, large Russian investments in Arctic military infrastructure clearly indicate that the competition for regional influence is intensifying. As resources and international shipping routes become increasingly vital in the region, they have been, and will continue to be, a key focus of rivalry among major powers, as demonstrated by the growing interest and cooperation between Russia and China in the area. As East-West relations cool, geopolitical focus on the Arctic increases. Consequently, NATO’s military infrastructure and collaboration among Arctic partners become even more important in addressing rising competition, climate change effects, and sovereignty disputes in the area. Therefore, it is vital for NATO allies to substantially invest in Arctic infrastructure and enhance their defence capabilities there.

Gaps in NATO’s Arctic Infrastructure and Capabilities

The expansion of NATO into Finland and Sweden adds to Russia's sense of encirclement, weakening its position in the region and creating the potential for it to act aggressively and unpredictably in response to the increased NATO presence on its Arctic doorstep (de Henning Michaelis, 2023). Russia's use of hybrid tactics in the region is increasing in both frequency and severity. (Wall and Wegge, 2023, 1). These tactics involve intimidating and destabilizing NATO members in the Arctic by gathering intelligence on critical NATO infrastructure in the region, signalling dissatisfaction and sowing discord within NATO societies (Wall and Wegge, 2023).  As a result, the possibility of conflict increases, underscoring the need to enhance infrastructure and cooperation among Arctic allies as a deterrent mechanism against Russian aggression. 

Despite the added Arctic presence that Finland and Sweden’s accession into NATO has provided, the high north still presents strategic vulnerabilities for the alliance, namely the absence of an integrated strategy and defence presence (Duffy et al. 2025, 80). This lack of defence presence is highlighted by NATO’s naval readiness, or lack thereof, in the region, particularly in icebreaker vessels, with NATO having no more than 35 combined icebreaker vessels compared to China and Russia’s 49 (Ibid.). Furthermore, allied cooperation in the region has been slow to adapt to the shifting geopolitical significance of the Arctic due to disagreements and a lack of consensus between NATO members, hesitant to open the region to any third party (Schaller & Sam-Aggrey 2020).  This is problematic because Russia has continued to sustain, and even increase its military investment in the Arctic, despite the operation being carried out in Ukraine (Duffy et al. 2025, 79). Due to the challenges of integrating NATO forces in the Arctic and the mounting external threats to the alliance in the region, the following recommendations are proposed to secure NATO’s northern flank.

Recommendations:

A) Invest in Bolstering Allied Arctic Infrastructure

· Modernize and expand naval ports and airfields in the region.

-Focus on critical and underdeveloped areas, for exampleNorthern Canada and Greenland.

-Critical to spread throughout the region in order to allow for resupplies and further operational readiness capabilities.

· Create a permanent NATO-badged facility in the Arctic. This would create enhanced deterrence to potential adversaries and signal the organization's clear commitment to defending the sovereignty of its critical northern partners. Furthermore, a permanent NATO-Arctic force would enable an immediate response and increased readiness to threats, while providing pre-positioned assets and command-and-control structures, leading to greater self-sufficiency and operational sustainability.

B) Increase Joint Military Capabilities and Readiness in the Region

· Invest heavily in the alliance’s icebreaker fleet in order to counter the advantage that Russia and China have regarding icebreaking and shipping capabilities. Strive to set a target of 40 collective icebreaker vessels by 2030.

· Increase the frequency and complexity of coordinated multinational exercises in the region. A permanent NATO-badged facility would provide the necessary expertise and be based on the enhanced interoperability and expertise that a permanent station would offer.

· Create new and modernize existing infrastructure to accommodate larger vessels, aircraft, and NATO-standardized equipment. This would enable newly created or renovated stations to accommodate the diverse range of equipment used by member states.

C) Create a formalized and coordinated NATO Arctic Doctrine

· Critical to eliminate strategic ambiguity and clearly outline the shared interests and operational objectives of the alliance in the region. Do so by establishing a working group of NATO Arctic members to create a formal doctrine by 2030.

· Essential to strengthening NATO’s deterrence posture in the region. Furthermore, by creating a clear signal of the alliance's commitments, the risk of miscalculation and accidental escalation is minimized.

· Provide a clear foundation for the procedure in which to engage with non-NATO countries and non-state actors. 

Bibliography

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Bruun, Johanne M., and Ingrid A. Medby. 2014. “Theorising the thaw: Geopolitics in a changing   Arctic.” Geography Compass 8 (12): 915-929.

Greaves, Wilfird. 2019. “Arctic break up: Climate change, geopolitics, and the fragmenting Arctic security region.” Arctic Yearbook 2019: Redefining Arctic Security:1-17.

De Henning Michaelis, S. (2023) “What Multilateral Strategy for Canada in the Arctic?”, Policy, 27(1), pp. 1-5. 

Duffy, Ryan R., Jahara Matisek, Jeremy M. McKenzie, and Chad M. Pillai. "NATO's Long Cold Front: Why NATO Must Reorganize Its Approach to Defending the European High North." Journal of Advanced Military Studies 16 (2025): 78-98.

Koenigk, Torben, Jeff Key, and Timo Vihma. 2020 "Climate change in the Arctic." Physics and chemistry of the Arctic atmosphere: 673-705.

Lackenbauer, P. Whitney, and Adam Lajeunesse. 2016. "The Canadian Armed Forces in the Arctic: building appropriate capabilities." Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 16 (4): 7-66.

Schaller, Benjamin, and Horatio Sam-Aggrey. "NATO, THE OSCE, AND THE ARCTIC REGION." Routledge Handbook of Arctic Security (2020).

Spohr, Alexandre Piffero, J. D. Höring, Luíza Gimenez Cerioli, Bruna Lersch, and Josuá Gihad Alves Soares. 2013. "The militarization of the Arctic: Political, economic and climate challenges." UFRGS Model United Nations Journal 1 (3): 11-70.

Wall, C. and Wegge, N. (2023) “The Russian Arctic Threat”, CSIS Briefs, pp. 1-16. Available at: https://www. csis. org/analysis/russian-arctic-threat-consequences-ukraine-war