Modern-day geopolitical competition features key strategic arenas coexisting within a highly interconnected economic and industrial global ecosystem: semiconductors, artificial intelligence, cloud computing, quantum technologies, and digital infrastructure can no longer be understood as mere engines of economic growth; they have become highly valuable strategic assets underpinning national security, economic resilience, and military capability. The ability to develop, control, and secure these technologies has thus emerged among governments’ top concerns in navigating an international environment characterized by growing technological interdependence (Farrell and Newman 2019; Hobbs 2020). In Europe, the rapidly changing nature of this landscape has prompted a fundamentally significant reassessment of the very relationship between technology, sovereignty, and security. 

The European Commission’s Tech Sovereignty Package, unveiled in June 2026, effectively stands as the most recent and clearest articulation of this reassessment (European Commission 2026a). Building on numerous previous converging initiatives such as the European Chips Act and the European Economic Security Strategy, the Tech Sovereignty package aims to bolster Europe’s capacity to develop and control strategic technologies across the wide-spanning digital ecosystem - this starts as down stream as rare earths and semiconductors, all the way to cloud infrastructure, open source software, and artificial intelligence (European Commission 2026b; European Commission 2026c). The message seems clear: technological dependencies are increasingly understood and operationalized as strategic liabilities that may expose Europe to geopolitical coercion, supply chain disruptions, and external political influence (European Commission 2023; Floridi 2020).

Beneath the surface of this issue lies another fundamentally strategic dilemma. The very technologies that Europe seeks to secure domestically also constitute the foundation of an integrated transatlantic security architecture. NATO’s growing reliance on emerging technologies, artificial intelligence, digital infrastructure, and secure data ecosystems is demonstrative of how technological resilience increasingly depends on a strong and cooperative alliance (NATO n.d.; NATO 2026). Efforts to reduce dependence on external actors may thus strengthen European resilience, yet they also run the risk of fragmenting the transatlantic technological ecosystem – the Americano-European divide being the primary concern – particularly if pursued through de facto technological separation, incompatible standards, or even exclusionary industrial policy. As scholars have pointed out, Europe must align its pursuit of technological and digital sovereignty with continued and sustained cooperation among trusted democratic partners within the broader trans-Atlantic security environment (Burwell & Propp 2022).

This piece examines whether European technological sovereignty can strengthen transatlantic security without producing technological fragmentation within the alliance. The measure of success for European technological sovereignty isn’t merely based on reducing external dependencies, but also to a great extent on whether it strengthens European resilience while preserving transatlantic interoperability. 

The central question: How can the EU pursue technological sovereignty in a way that strengthens European resilience without fragmenting the transatlantic technological and security ecosystem?

WHY TECHNOLOGICAL SOVEREIGNTY HAS BECOME A SECURITY ISSUE

The concept of technological sovereignty has undergone a profound transformation over the past decade, and remains a heavily contested one. Initially associated with questions of digital governance, data protection, and regulatory capacity, it has recently evolved into a broader security concept spanning industrial capacity, critical infrastructure, and geopolitical resilience (Floridi 2020; Pohle and Thiel 2020). While early debates largely focused on Europe's ability to regulate the digital economy and safeguard fundamental rights in an increasingly interconnected online environment, recent developments have shifted attention towards the strategic vulnerabilities created by technological dependence on external actors (Carver 2024). In fact, those vulnerabilities also pave the way for distinct, yet connected and converging conceptualizations of digital sovereignty at national level, along with differing political and operational functions attached to it. 

These developments strongly reflect the changing nature of the international environment where technology has re-emerged as a central instrument of geopolitical competition, recalling historical periods where industrial and technological superiority - from the Industrial Revolution to the Cold War's space and nuclear races - were a determining factor in shaping the global balance of power. The COVID-19 pandemic exposed the fragility of global supply chains, demonstrating how disruptions in the production and distribution of critical goods could rapidly evolve into broader security challenges. It also served to show how far-reaching modern industrial ecosystems in the tech domain are. Russia's invasion of Ukraine further reinforced the risks associated with overdependence, as economic interdependence was exploited as a tool of coercion, particularly in the energy sector. Simultaneously, intensifying technological competition between the United States and China has highlighted the growing importance of semiconductors, artificial intelligence, cloud infrastructure, and other critical technologies as sources of economic and geopolitical power, and well-established arenas for global power competition (Farrell and Newman 2019; Hobbs 2020; Miller 2022).

Against this turn of events, the European Union has progressively reframed technological sovereignty as a means of strengthening its economic security and strategic resilience. The European Economic Security Strategy marked an important shift. It identified strategic dependencies and critical technologies as central policy concerns, arguing that Europe's openness must develop in conjunction with measures to reduce vulnerabilities in key sectors (European Commission 2023). Rather than advocating for absolute technological self-sufficiency, the Strategy introduced a more comprehensive approach built around resilience, risk management, and the protection of critical technologies. This perspective has further been reinforced with initiatives such as the European Chips Act and, most recently, the Tech Sovereignty Package, effectively seeking to expand Europe's technological capabilities while maintaining cooperation with trusted international partners (European Commission 2026b; European Commission 2026c).

Yet this transformation also lays the foundation for an essential conceptual challenge. As the conceptual scope of technological sovereignty has expanded well beyond its original regulatory foundations, it has become increasingly integrated within the broader security debate. Existing scholarship continues to employ a variety of overlapping concepts—including digital sovereignty, technological sovereignty, strategic autonomy, and economic security—to describe Europe's coordinated response to technological dependence (Floridi 2020; Pohle and Thiel 2020; Hobbs 2020). While these concepts extend far beyond the technological domain - covering areas such as energy, defence, critical raw materials, and industrial resilience - they increasingly converge around a common objective: reducing Europe's exposure to external vulnerabilities in strategically important technologies. The question is therefore no longer whether technological sovereignty has become a security issue, but how this pursuit of resilience can be reconciled with Europe's continued reliance on deeply integrated transatlantic technological and defence ecosystems.

THE SOVEREIGNTY PARADOX

The pursuit of European technological sovereignty addresses a legitimate objective: to reduce critical dependencies that can hurt the European Union. Strengthening European capabilities in critical technologies has grown into a quasi-existential component of economic security and strategic resilience (European Commission 2023; European Commission 2026b).

However, the technologies on which this agenda focuses cannot be found existing exclusively within European ecosystems. For example, cloud infrastructure, semiconductors, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, and advanced software are developed through highly integrated transatlantic networks. European industries still rely on American cloud providers, or semiconductor design tools, while the United States depends on European capabilities such as in advanced lithography, defence technologies, or industrial manufacturing (Farrell and Newman 2019; Miller 2022; Burwell and Propp 2022). Technological interdependence cannot be understood otherwise than as a defining feature of the transatlantic bond. 

This interdependence stretches far beyond economic competitiveness. NATO depends ever more on disruptive and emerging technologies – this includes artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, cloud computing and infrastructure – to ensure the continuity of deterrence and collective defence (NATO n.d.; NATO 2026). As a result of this changing reality, alliance interoperability depends far more on shared technological standards, secure data environments, connected digital infrastructure, and interconnected critical industrial supply chains. 

This points at what one could effectively view as a strategic paradox – one among many when it comes to the European Union’s strategic objectives. Reducing excessive dependence is undoubtedly necessary to bolster Europe’s resilience. However, technological sovereignty pursued through fundamentally exclusionary industrial policy, incompatible standards, or even unnecessary duplication should still allow for the preservation of an integrated technological ecosystem upon which transatlantic security depends. In this respect, policy initiatives aiming to reduce strategic vulnerabilities may inadvertently create new ones that fragment cooperation among trusted allies (Komaitis 2023; Burwell and Propp 2022).

This is not an argument opposing technological sovereignty by any means, but rather an attempt to bring attention to the necessity of distinguishing between dependence on strategic competitors and interdependence among trusted allies. The former may serve to justify derisking and diversification initiatives, while the latter constitutes a strategic asset enhancing collective resilience. Treating all external technological relationships as equally risky could ultimately end up undermining alliance cohesion and European resilience at its core (Farrell and Newman 2019; Burwell and Propp 2022).

The crucial challenge thus evolves from debates surrounding whether Europe should pursue technological sovereignty – as Europe-wide consensus supporting this is undeniably strengthening already – towards the question of how it can do so in a way that technological integration underpinning transatlantic security is sustainably preserved. 

RESILIENCE WITHOUT FRAGMENTATION

The sovereignty paradox exposed earlier posits that technological sovereignty cannot be assessed only by the extent to which external dependencies are reduced. A more meaningful and pragmatic evaluation prompts consideration for whether these measures preserve the cooperation and interoperability on which transatlantic security depends. Technological sovereignty should thus be understood as a means to strengthen Europe’s strategic resilience, rather than an end in itself.

This perspective requires a distinction between dependencies that create vulnerabilities, and interdependence that can actually enhance resilience. Dependencies on strategic competitors expose Europe to coercion or disruption, justifying efforts to diversify supply chains or strengthen domestic capabilities. By contrast, technological dependencies among trusted allies unequivocally support innovation, interoperability, and shared capabilities. 

Against this backdrop, this paper stresses the importance of resilience without fragmentation as a key analytical framework for the assessment of European technological sovereignty. Instead of merely measuring technological self-sufficiency, or the replacement of foreign technologies with European ones, a realistic and pragmatic analytical lens should simultaneously consider two key objectives: reducing strategic vulnerabilities and preserving transatlantic technological integration. 

When applied to the EU’s recent Tech Sovereignty Package, this analytical approach shifts the focus from autonomy to resilience. Measures to simultaneously strengthen European technological capabilities while also maintaining interoperability with trusted allies reinforce both European security and transatlantic solidarity.  Conversely, generating unnecessary duplication, incompatible standards, or barriers to cooperation may reduce dependencies at the cost of a weaker and more fragmented transatlantic technological ecosystem. 

CONCLUSION

As technology has become the trendiest pillar of geopolitical competition, European Technological sovereignty is no longer a matter of industrial policy alone, but purely a question of security. That said, greater protection must not be confused with greater isolation. The European Union faces a crucial challenge: to reduce strategic vulnerabilities without weakening the technological partnerships underpinning transatlantic security. This paper’s central argument is that a key determinant of the success of the EU’s Tech sovereignty package is whether resilience is being built without transatlantic fragmentation. 

Very few will oppose the idea that the EU should pursue greater technological sovereignty, yet not as many as one might think fully grasp that the real challenge lies not in becoming more sovereign, but in becoming more resilient without fragmenting the transatlantic alliance.

References

Burwell, Frances G., and Andrea G. Rodríguez. 2023. “The US-EU Trade and Technology Council: Assessing the Record on Data and Technology Issues”. Atlantic Council, April 20. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/us-eu-ttc-record-on-data-technology-issues/?utm_

Carver, Julia. 2024. "More Bark than Bite? European Digital Sovereignty Discourse and Changes to the European Union's External Relations Policy." Journal of European Public Policy 31 (8): 2250–2286. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2023.2295523.

European Commission. 2026a. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on European Tech Sovereignty, Accompanied by an EU Open Source Strategy. COM(2026) 503 final. Brussels: European Commission, June 3. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52026DC0503.

European Commission. 2026b. “Commission Proposes Tech Sovereignty Package to Strengthen Europe's Digital Autonomy and Resilience”. Press release, June 3. https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/commission-proposes-tech-sovereignty-package-strengthen-europes-digital-autonomy-and-resilience.

European Commission. 2026c. “Strengthening Europe's Tech Sovereignty. Shaping Europe's Digital Future”. Last modified June 3. https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-tech-sovereignty.

Farrell, Henry, and Abraham L. Newman. 2019. "Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion." International Security 44 (1): 42–79. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00351.

Floridi, Luciano. 2020. "The Fight for Digital Sovereignty: What It Is, and Why It Matters, Especially for the EU." Philosophy & Technology 33 (3): 369–378. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-020-00423-6.

Hobbs, Carla, ed. 2020. Europe's Digital Sovereignty: From Rulemaker to Superpower in the Age of US-China Rivalry. Essay Collection. European Council on Foreign Relations. https://ecfr.eu/publication/europe_digital_sovereignty_rulemaker_superpower_age_us_china_rivalry/?utm_

Komaitis, Konstantinos. 2021. "Europe's Ambition for Digital Sovereignty Must Not Undermine the Internet's Values." Computer Fraud & Security 2021 (1): 11–13. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1361-3723(21)00008-7. 

Miller, Chris. 2022. Chip War: The Fight for the World's Most Critical Technology. New York: Scribner.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 2026. “Alliance Digital Strategy”. NATO, January 13. https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/official-texts-and-resources/official-texts/2026/01/13/alliance-digital-strategy.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. n.d. “Emerging and Disruptive Technologies”. NATO. Accessed July 11, 2026. https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/deterrence-and-defence/emerging-and-disruptive-technologies.

Pohle, Julia, and Thorsten Thiel. 2020. "Digital Sovereignty." Internet Policy Review 9 (4). https://doi.org/10.14763/2020.4.1532.