The Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) relations with Iran rest on a delicate balance between deterrence, dialogue, and national sovereignty. While the GCC shares Iran's concerns over missile capabilities, regional armed groups, nuclear ambitions, and Middle Eastern influence, its member states have adopted divergent foreign policies. These differing policies have preserved diplomatic ties, but at the cost of bargaining power and regional stability during crises. The GCC should strike a balance between deterrence and dialogue. A balanced policy could involve setting common red lines with Iran, a graduated response, a joint security forum, and coordinated mediation efforts. This approach would allow the GCC to secure its region and maintain diplomatic channels with Iran.

This brief is also relevant to North Atlantic countries because instability in the Gulf directly affects European and transatlantic security interests. Escalation involving Iran can disrupt energy supplies, threaten maritime routes through the Strait of Hormuz and Red Sea, and increase demands on NATO members for naval deployments, air defence and crisis management. A more coordinated GCC approach would therefore not only strengthen regional stability but also reduce the likelihood that North Atlantic states are drawn into repeated Gulf security crises. 

Introduction and regional context

The Gulf region is a hotbed of geopolitical tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia, with several countries caught in the crossfire of regional and external powers. Iran, in particular, is deeply connected to the security of every country within the GCC due to its missile and nuclear programs, its geographical location, and its relationships with various armed groups within the region (Gause 2009). The GCC countries, meanwhile, are bound to the United States by military bases and a reliance on US arms and support (Roberts 2025; Saleh 2020). This web of connections has led the GCC countries to adopt divergent policies towards Iran. Yet, they must find a way to coordinate their stance without sacrificing the diplomatic flexibility that allows Oman, Kuwait and Qatar to engage with Iran directly.

The Policy Problem: Fragmented GCC Approaches

The main obstacle to the GCC adopting a common policy towards Iran stems from the divergent threats each country perceives to its national interests. Countries like Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and, in the past, the United Arab Emirates have always taken a stance of opposition towards Iran. However, countries like Oman, Kuwait and Qatar have focused more on maintaining dialogue with Iran and preserving channels of communication (Bianco 2020; Glombitza & Zaccara 2021). Oman, for instance, employs strategic hedging to balance both its partnerships with the West and GCC countries, and its relationship with Iran (Binhuwaidin 2019).

Divergent policies among GCC countries arise from their geographic and economic interests, as well as differing concepts of abandonment or entrapment by external allies. While varied diplomacy can facilitate communication with external allies, it becomes a liability if the GCC's diplomacy is inconsistent, if individual countries negotiate separate deals, or if they are uncertain about the GCC's response to threats. The GCC's weakness lies not in the absence of uniformity, but in the lack of rules connecting each country's diplomacy to the collective security of the GCC.

Why Existing Approaches Are Insufficient

Existing approaches towards Iran, namely siding with the U.S., economic pressure, and accommodating policies, address individual security concerns but have not produced a stable relationship between Tehran and the GCC. Bilateral engagement allows states such as Oman and Qatar to preserve communication and facilitate mediation. Nevertheless, separate diplomatic initiatives can reinforce GCC fragmentation, produce inconsistent signals and reduce the Council’s collective bargaining power (Bianco & Stansfield 2018).

Reliance on the United States also remains insufficient as a stand-alone strategy. American military infrastructure, technology and operational support continue to underpin Gulf defence, making rapid strategic independence unrealistic (Roberts 2025). However, excessive dependence can restrict GCC foreign-policy autonomy and expose member states to entrapment in confrontations initiated by external partners.

A further approach relevant to GCC policy is the use of economic pressure as part of a broader strategy of containment. Although the 2018 “maximum pressure” campaign was initiated by the United States rather than the GCC collectively, some Gulf states supported elements of this strategy. The UAE, in particular, cooperated with US sanctions by restricting financial transactions and reducing economic activity involving Iranian businesses, while Saudi Arabia also supported a harder regional approach towards Tehran (Zweiri 2022). This experience is relevant when considering whether the GCC should adopt stronger coordinated economic pressure against Iran. While sanctions imposed substantial costs on the Iranian economy, they did not produce the political concessions sought by Washington. Instead, Iran expanded parts of its nuclear programme and relied more heavily on asymmetric deterrence and regional partners in response to external pressure (Drezner 2022). This suggests that economic pressure may form part of a GCC strategy, but is unlikely to succeed as a stand-alone instrument. 

Unconditional accommodation is equally inadequate. Dialogue can reduce immediate tensions, but without verification, collective red lines or credible consequences, it may not constrain missiles, maritime coercion or support for armed groups. The GCC therefore requires a combined strategy: engagement should provide routes towards de-escalation, while collective deterrence should establish the costs of coercive behaviour.

Policy Options

The GCC has three broad policy options for managing relations with Iran. The first is to continue national hedging, allowing each member to balance diplomatic engagement, deterrence and external partnerships according to its own interests. This preserves flexibility and reflects the growing autonomy of Gulf foreign policies. However, divergent threat perceptions can weaken the GCC’s institutional effectiveness and enable external actors to exploit internal divisions (Al-Khulaifi 2025; Bakir & Al-Shamari 2025).

The second option is collective containment, involving coordinated diplomatic pressure, economic restrictions and stronger military alignment against Iran. Although this could demonstrate unity, it may intensify the regional security dilemma, reduce opportunities for mediation and increase GCC dependence on external military powers (Mabon et al. 2021).

The third and most viable option is coordinated deterrence and dialogue. Under this approach, GCC states would establish common security principles and responses to coercion while retaining separate diplomatic relationships with Tehran. Research on regional security supports an incremental process combining dialogue, confidence-building and collective security partnerships rather than treating engagement and deterrence as mutually exclusive (Vakil & Quilliam 2021). This option offers the strongest balance between GCC unity, national autonomy and regional de-escalation.

Recommended Strategy: Coordinated Deterrence and Dialogue

The GCC should adopt a strategy of coordinated deterrence and dialogue rather than attempting to impose a completely uniform foreign policy towards Iran. The different threat perceptions of GCC members make identical national approaches unrealistic; however, members can still agree on minimum principles governing collective security (Bianco 2020). These should include common red lines against direct attacks, proxy-based coercion, disruption of maritime navigation and interference in the domestic affairs of member states.

• Creating a graduated response mechanism

First, the GCC should create a graduated response mechanism. Lower-level incidents should trigger joint consultation, investigation and diplomatic action, while direct aggression should produce coordinated political, economic and defensive measures. Predetermined procedures would reduce uncertainty and strengthen deterrence without making military escalation automatic.

• Establishing a GCC-Iran security forum

Second, a permanent GCC–Iran security forum should be established. Its initial agenda should focus on practical confidence-building measures, including maritime incidents, advance notification of military exercises, nuclear safety, missile and drone risks, and the activities of regional armed groups. Iran has previously proposed regional engagement initiatives, but dialogue should be supported by monitoring and verification rather than accepted solely on the basis of political declarations (Glombitza & Zaccara 2021).

• Establishing a coordinated diplomatic strategy

Third, the GCC should formalise a diplomatic division of labour. Oman and Qatar could preserve crisis-communication and mediation channels, Kuwait could support consensus-building, and Saudi Arabia could provide overall political coordination. External partners, particularly the United States, should support early warning and defensive deterrence without determining GCC policy. This is important because Gulf security remains connected to American military systems and institutional relationships despite growing regional demands for autonomy (Roberts 2025).

• Clarifying common red lines

Finally, economic and diplomatic cooperation with Iran should be conditional on verifiable restraint. Incentives should therefore be linked to respect for GCC sovereignty, freedom of navigation and non-support for attacks against member states.

Implementation and risks

Implementation should begin with the GCC foreign ministers adopting a common framework defining collective red lines, consultation procedures and graduated responses to coercion. National security advisers should then establish a permanent coordination mechanism, while a GCC–Iran contact group should manage dialogue and crisis communication. External partners, particularly the United States and European states, should provide defensive, intelligence and technical support because the GCC continues to rely on external capabilities that cannot be rapidly replaced. However, these partners should support rather than direct the diplomatic process. Excessive external control could reproduce existing patterns of dependency, limit the ability of GCC states to define their own security priorities and increase the risk that Gulf states become drawn into confrontations that do not fully reflect their interests (Saleh 2020; Roberts 2025). A GCC-led process would therefore combine continued access to Western security capabilities with greater regional ownership and foreign-policy autonomy. 

Several risks remain. Iran may interpret greater GCC coordination as a containment strategy, potentially intensifying the regional security dilemma (Kamrava 2021). Individual GCC members may also resist restrictions on their bilateral diplomacy. These risks can be mitigated by making consultation, rather than complete policy uniformity, the foundation of the framework and by presenting it as defensive, reciprocal and regionally led.

Conclusion

The GCC does not require complete foreign-policy uniformity towards Iran, but it does need greater coordination. A strategy combining collective deterrence, institutionalised dialogue and prior consultation would strengthen regional credibility while preserving national autonomy. This approach offers the most realistic path towards reducing escalation and improving long-term Gulf security.

The Gulf security has direct implications for North Atlantic states. The United States and several European countries maintain extensive diplomatic, military and economic interests in the Gulf, while instability involving Iran can affect energy markets, maritime trade routes and demands for Western military involvement. A more coordinated GCC foreign policy towards Iran could therefore reduce the likelihood of regional escalation, limit pressure on North Atlantic security commitments and contribute to a more stable strategic environment for both Europe and North America. 

References

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