Change of Course: Is Now the Time for the EU to Pursue Closer Relationships with Australia?

Given growing concerns about the reliability of the United States as an ally and increasing Chinese assertiveness in the Western Pacific, is the time now for the EU to strengthen bonds with Australia? 

Since 1952, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has asserted sovereignty over the entirety of the South China Sea, including the Spratly and Paracel Islands as part of its claimed historic rights (People’s Republic of China 2009). These claims, commonly referred to as the 9-dash line, also encompass the continental shelves of both Malaysia and Vietnam, as well as maritime territory claimed by the Philippines. China insists that these territories are indisputable parts of China and have always been. The PRC also insists that it has the right to control navigation, reconnaissance, and airspace within the 9-dash line.

To enforce these claims, the PRC has been employing increasingly aggressive methods, including economic and military posturing and harassment. Since the 2010s, the PRC has continued to enforce these claims. Chinese vessels have harassed freedom of navigation patrols (armed patrols by the US and others ensuring free commerce through international waters), constructed artificial islands (Southerland 2016), and militarized them (Associated Press 2022; Wagner 2018). In 2023, a Chinese coast guard vessel used a laser on a Philippine coast guard ship, blinding crew members. Later that year, Chinese vessels turned water cannons on civilian Filipino ships on a resupply mission to the Philippine-claimed Spratly Islands (Sari 2024). 

Fundamental to the Western containment of the Chinese military expansion is the Island Chain Strategy: if China wishes to dominate the Pacific, it must first dominate two island chains. The first island chain consists of Taiwan, Japan, the Philippines, and Malaysia; the second consists of Japan, Guam, and Micronesia. China has made significant headway in controlling the first island chain, especially through its actions in the Spratly Islands (Espeña and Uy Bomping 2020). 

In response to this aggression, Australia, which is dependent on South China Sea maritime routes for two-thirds of its exports, has recently adopted a more defensive posture towards the PRC. This defensive posture has included joining AUKUS in 2021 (BBC 2021) and a general increase in tension in bilateral relationships between China and Australia, primarily through a review of economic ties and operations to counter Chinese influence on domestic Australian politics (Commonwealth of Australia 2025). China, however, does remain a primary trading partner for Australia, and trade has only increased in recent years. 

Since the election of Trump in 2024, the United States’ credibility as an ally has eroded. From decreasing funding for the war effort in Ukraine to making stringent funding demands of its allies, America is making itself a less and less attractive ally. Recently, American Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth demanded that Australia increase military spending to 3.5% of GDP, a common American demand as of late. Prime Minister Albanese publicly refused this demand (Feigenbaum 2025). While Australia has spent most of its post-WW2 lifetime in an extremely close partnership with America, Trump’s erratic conduct and imposition of 10% tariffs on all Australian goods, with a further 25% on steel and aluminum, have caused many in Australia to reconsider the previously ironclad Australia-US partnership (Kim 2025).

In this uncertain climate, Australia might be well served by looking for a more stable partner, especially as Chinese actions and rhetoric in the Western Pacific become more assertive. The EU is already a promoter of the rules-based international order, global trade, and free navigation. Australia and the EU face the same sorts of threats, albeit from different actors: potential regional hegemons attempting to illegally expand and to destabilize them and their allies (Sussex 2025). A potential EU-Australia partnership can use the similarity of threats between Australia and the EU, posed by China and Russia, respectively, to strengthen defenses against both. Both Russia and China use psychological and social operations to sow discord and distrust among their adversaries, and the EU has been making strides in methods for combating these tactics, such as legislation and governmental agencies aimed at preventing the spread of disinformation (EDMO 2025; EUvsDisinfo 2025). The EU cannot compete with the US in terms of naval power, and the AUKUS partnership will remain important to Australia for the foreseeable future. However, the EU’s advantage in combating hybrid operations leaves it an opening to increase influence in the region and to continue to combat anti-democratic expansion in the world at large.

Recommendations
Establish a joint counter-hybrid operations framework:
Especially in the AI age, psychological operations and disinformation campaigns will only get more widespread, more sophisticated, and more international. Being ready for these attacks before they happen is crucial for minimizing their effect, and a joint task force between the EU and Australia would help to bring the EU and Australia closer, while simultaneously combating Russian and Chinese influence in the digital space.

Increase critical minerals trade with Australia:
Australia and the EU both suffer from economic dependence on Russia and China, and reducing this dependence will help to increase the chances of peace and to increase resilience in the event of further aggression. Australia has immense reserves of lithium, which the EU needs to continue the green energy transition. By negotiating preferential trade policies with Australia, the EU can benefit both from diminished Chinese economic power and lowered domestic energy and manufacturing prices.

Increased EU patrols in the South China Sea:
While not particularly impactful from a material perspective, increasing EU patrols in the South China Sea demonstrates a commitment to the rules-based international order and provides assurances to Australia about the EU’s investment in mutual security

Bibliography
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