Beyond the Bear: China's Growing Arctic Threat

Although China is increasingly referenced in discussions surrounding threats to NATO in the Arctic, Russia remains the primary focus. China is not an Arctic nation, yet it portrays the region as a global crossroads and has sought to expand its presence both through economic and military means (Garamone 2024). This intention dates back to 2014, when Xi Jinping declared that China would become a major polar power and presented the Arctic as the third corridor of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (Paul 2025). 

The United States (US) and its European NATO allies often frame Russia and China as a joint challenge in the Arctic (Jouan et al. 2025). Yet, China has fallen short of several planned economic ventures in the Arctic due to political pressure, suggesting that it is taking a more cautious posture than Russia (ibid.). As China develops its Arctic infrastructure and adopts a more assertive stance in the region, it is becoming increasingly essential for NATO to account for its growing capabilities and potential threats. Despite intensifying cooperation between China and Russia, especially since the start of Russia’s War on Ukraine, both regimes are pursuing different long-term strategic objectives in the region, each posing distinct threats to the alliance. While Russia’s threat stems primarily from military influence and power projection, China’s influence is more pronounced in the domains of economic security and the shaping of international norms. Addressing these divergent risks requires a tailored approach that considers China’s expanding Arctic capabilities and ambitions. At the same time, NATO cannot afford to underestimate China’s increasing naval power in the Arctic in the years ahead. Specific risks that NATO faces as China expands its Arctic operational capacity include vulnerabilities in supply chains, as well as control over and influence on critical infrastructure including ports, shipping lanes, and deep-sea cables.

There is a clear upside to China's pursuit of expanded economic power in the Arctic, which explains why the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has undertaken significant adaptation strategies for Arctic operations (Swanstrom 2025). These efforts include the development of specialized units and equipment tailored specifically for Arctic conditions (ibid.). Beyond military adaptation, China is increasingly using scientific research and economic initiatives to strengthen its legitimacy and footprint in the Arctic, raising concerns about its long-term intentions (Garamone 2024). China maintains research stations in Svalbard and Iceland that have clear dual-use potential, exemplifying its civil-military fusion strategy (Paul 2025). At the same time, its attempts to invest in Arctic ports, airports, and land across the Nordic countries have largely been blocked, leaving Russia as China’s primary partner for Arctic expansion (ibid.). China’s involvement in projects like oil exploration in Iceland’s Dreki area, Greenland’s Isua iron ore field, and the Greenland airport corridor have either been abandoned or blocked, underlining the difficulties it has faced outside of Russia’s Arctic zone (Jouan et al. 2025)

China’s economic involvement in Russia’s Arctic region has steadily deepened. In 2013, the China National Petroleum Corporation acquired a 20% stake in Russia’s Yamal LNG project, followed by a deepened engagement agreement signed in 2017 to develop the Polar Silk Road (Jouan et al. 2025). While China continues to enhance the military dimension of its Arctic capabilities, its primary strategic interests remain economic, focused on resource extraction and the development of shipping routes (Pincus 2020, 43). As Malte Humpert of The Arctic Institute has noted, the Arctic is the first global region where climate change is directly playing an active role in reshaping geopolitics, turning previously inaccessible areas into viable shipping lanes (Sapio 2025). A clear signal of China’s shipping ambitions came in 2024, when three Chinese icebreakers operated in the Arctic for the first time, prompting Russian state media to publish that “The Arctic is becoming Chinese” (Paul 2025). This reflects China’s broader grand strategy and is no longer a hypothetical projection. In October 2025, a Chinese vessel, the Istanbul Bridge, completed a landmark Arctic transit from East China to the United Kingdom, cutting transit time by nearly half compared with routes through the Suez Canal or Cape of Good Hope (Reuters 2025). Although current shipping volumes through the Arctic remain limited, it is clear that China is pursuing a long-term strategy, using voyages like the Istanbul Bridge to train crews, build knowledge, and prepare for a future in which the Arctic becomes a major shipping traffic avenue (Sapio 2025). At the same time, while the voyage is illustrative of China’s geoeconomic ambitions in the Arctic, it also underlines that China’s goals are dependent on Russian-controlled waters in the region. 

The North American Arctic has also emerged as a critical flashpoint for the NATO alliance, and an area of opportunity for adversaries to drive a wedge and advance their economic ambitions. In the past, established cooperation regimes among NATO allies in the region, and the limited accessibility of Arctic shipping lanes, allowed sovereignty disputes between Canada and the United States, particularly claims to critical shipping routes in the Beaufort Sea and the Northwest Passage (NWP), to lie dormant. Today, the re-emergence of great power competition and China’s growing interest in the Arctic risk bringing these disputes back to the surface, undermining cohesion between NATO allies at a time when regional cooperation is increasingly paramount (Huebert 2009). The US maintains that the NWP is international waters, whereas Canada claims it as internal waters (The Economist 2019). This ambiguity in the interpretation of control over shipping lanes is troublesome, as increased shipping in the region, especially driven by Chinese or Russian transport, could be a point of friction for the alliance (Lajeunesse 2018). Moreover, disagreements and threatening rhetoric between NATO allies over Greenland further underscore a fundamental weakness in the Alliance’s approach to securing its Arctic flank.

The North American Arctic is not the only area where these weaknesses are evident. Svalbard, a sovereign Norwegian archipelago, functions as both a critical gateway for Arctic shipping and a hub for power projection in the region. Its unique legal framework through the Svalbard Treaty, which grants equal rights of residence and commercial activity, provides China with avenues to pursue its geopolitical agenda through formal legal means. This reflects China’s growing confidence in interpreting and shaping existing global governance structures with the aim of furthering its own national interests (Liu 2021, 1). For example, in 2024, China attempted to purchase land in Svalbard, although the effort was blocked by the Norwegian government due to national security concerns (Paul 2025).

Chinese activities in the Arctic are concentrated largely in communications, transport, and infrastructure, all sectors with large potential for military and intelligence applications (Jouan et al. 2025). This underscores the perception that China is using economic and scientific fronts to advance its strategic ambitions, even within sensitive governance regimes. The aforementioned Arctic flashpoints highlight not only strategic vulnerabilities for NATO but also how the Sino-Russian partnership, despite its flaws and contradictions, could potentially exploit divisions.

Nonetheless, the Sino-Russian partnership also displays points of friction that can be exploited. China’s repeated calls to internationalize Arctic governance do not align with Russia’s doctrine of Arctic exceptionalism and its insistence on limiting interference from non-Arctic states (Jouan et al. 2025). This incoherence specifically surfaced in their different responses to President Trump’s ambitions in Greenland, reflecting a limit within Sino-Russian alignment. While Chinese media praised Macron’s speech on Europe’s support for Greenland, Russia showed distrust toward the EU’s involvement in the Arctic (ibid.). Furthermore, as a resource-importing nation, China’s economic ambitions in the Arctic are clear. Yet, its vast demand for resources has already created, and could further provoke, friction with Russia over control of key assets and access to emerging shipping lanes (Jouan et al. 2025). In establishing itself as a “near Arctic state”, China could pose a strategic threat to Russia’s claims in the region, despite Sino-Russian cooperation already taking shape in concrete terms. For example, Russia and China have held joint bomber patrols off the coast of Alaska, in addition to establishing coordination between coast guards, and holding exercises in the Bering Strait (Garamone 2024). Since 2023, the two partners have also established a joint “umbrella organization” for Northern Sea Route traffic, in addition to coordinating Coast Guard Patrols that effectively grant China partial control over the route (Paul 2025). While this arrangement clearly benefits China, it also raises questions of sovereignty (ibid.). Recent voyages, like the Istanbul Bridge, show that China will rely on Russian-controlled waters, highlighting possibilities for cooperation but also a vulnerability in the Sino-Russian partnership (Reuters 2024). 

However fragile or strong the Sino-Russian cooperation may be, it is clear that NATO must adopt a two-pronged approach in the Arctic: strengthening its military posture to counter Russia’s immediate military threat, while simultaneously addressing longer-term economic challenges, including economic security and supply chain vulnerabilities, posed by China’s expanding presence. 

Policy Recommendations

• Focus on exploiting cracks in China and Russia’s “no limits” partnership. Rather than treating China solely as a threat, NATO and the EU could tactically engage China in the Arctic, using its more limited ambitions (relative to Russia) to drive a wedge between the two while reinforcing international governance norms.

• Adopt a tailored approach to countering China in the Arctic. NATO members should prioritize economic resilience and deterrence in response to China, while taking a more military-focused approach towards Russia. This includes more stringent vetting of foreign direct investment (FDI) for critical infrastructure, as well as controlling the export of dual-use technology.

• Prepare for an increased Chinese presence. Expect greater naval and commercial vessel activity as the Arctic becomes more central to China’s economic strategy in Europe.

• Enhance domain awareness and resilience. NATO should expand US-led efforts to improve situational awareness, increase allied exercises, and strengthen resilience against both military and economic activity by China and Russia in the Arctic. 

• By 2027, come to a consensus on a list of the most critical Arctic assets and develop a coordinated approach to counter foreign interference and investment in critical infrastructure. 

• Resolve the US-Canada disagreement over the NWP by 2030. Strengthening NATO solidarity in the North American Arctic is critical to countering both Chinese and Russian imposition. 

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