Introduction

Much attention has been paid to the growing role of non-Arctic states in the ongoing commodification and militarisation of the circumpolar Arctic. China is often the primary target of such analyses due to its close ties with Russia and its significant investment in research and commercial capabilities in the far north, culminating in its self-proclamation as a “near Arctic” state (Šimov 2026). This China-centric focus, however, has left the responses of other Asian observer states often underexamined. It is partly in response to Chinese expansion and China’s deepening alignment with Russia that fellow observer states, Japan and South Korea, have begun to reposition themselves in the region. Accordingly, this paper focuses specifically on Japan and South Korea, with China discussed as context.

This repositioning is unfolding against a broader backdrop of increased attention on the region, visible in a wave of recent national and alliance Arctic strategies. Russia listed the Arctic Ocean as a critically important maritime area in its 2022 Maritime Doctrine and tested nuclear-capable weapons in the region that year; the United Kingdom released its Arctic Policy Framework in 2023; France published an Arctic Defence Strategy in 2025; and NATO launched Arctic Sentry, a multi-domain activity strengthening deterrence and defence across the region (Dervovic et al. 2025; CAO 2025; French Ministry of Armed Forces 2025; UK Government 2023; NATO 2026). 

The intensifying strategic interest in the Arctic sits alongside existing regional governance architectures. The Arctic Council, the primary intergovernmental forum promoting cooperation in the Arctic, comprises 8 Arctic states, 6 permanent participants (groups representing the Indigenous peoples of the Arctic), and 38 observer states and organisations (Arctic Council 2020). When Asian nations first received observer status in 2013, the Arctic was still viewed as an “exceptional” region, marked by continued interstate cooperation and an absence of broader geopolitical tensions (Kim 2016; Nonnenmacher 2025). While much research has been placed on how the Arctic has shifted away from this regional “exceptionalism” since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, this paper looks at the current geopolitical realities and how the observer states of Japan and South Korea are adjusting to these realities, building up regional capabilities, and cooperating with partners in the region. As this paper shows, the two have responded in both similar and divergent ways. Japan is increasingly taking a security approach in its Arctic engagement, embedding the region in its national-security strategy and alliance cooperation. South Korea is industrialising its role, leveraging shipbuilding and scientific engagement to position itself as a non-militarised but indispensable stakeholder. Yet, both have demonstrated that the future of Arctic governance will increasingly depend on non-Arctic states as the region becomes increasingly important for global trade, investment, and security.

Japan: Security Integration and Strategic Depth

Japan is no longer a distant observer of the Arctic but is increasingly taking a proactive role in shaping it. It holds no territorial claims above the Arctic Circle and only gained Observer status at the Arctic Council in 2013 (Pham 2026; Kimura 2026; Hataya 2025). Nonetheless, treating it as peripheral to Arctic affairs misreads its geography and history.

Geography places Japan at the Pacific gateway to the Arctic. Hokkaido, its northernmost main island, sits relatively close to the Bering Strait, well positioned to support Arctic activity, and is separated from Russia's Sakhalin only by the Soya Strait; the Kuril Islands further north, held by Russia since 1945, also remain disputed (Pham 2026; Bhardwaj 2025; Zellen 2026a; Zellen 2026b; Zellen 2026c). Should competition over the Arctic destabilise the region, this dispute could become a wider flashpoint (Zellen 2026a; Zellen 2026b).

History also gives Japan the longest record of Arctic engagement of Asian states. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it dominated the seas and island territories of Northeast Asia bordering the Arctic, and during the Second World War it was described as a "bona fide polar power," controlling the Aleutian Islands and blocking American power projection across the North Pacific (Zellen 2026a; Zellen 2026b). That engagement continued in peacetime with Japan pursuing Arctic expeditions, establishing research stations, and being present at the Arctic Council's 1996 founding, a longer record than any other Asian state can claim (Pham 2026; Saccone 2026). Japan formalised its Arctic engagement in its first Arctic Policy in 2015, balancing scientific research, economic interests, and geopolitical strategy (Pham 2026).

Shipping and the Weaponisation of the Northern Sea Route

Japan treats Arctic sea routes as central to its security (Pham 2026). Among the emerging Arctic sea routes, the Northern Sea Route (NSR) take center stage in Japan's planning for its efficiency and energy access, while the Transpolar Sea Route and Northwest Passage remain marginal in attention (Pham 2026). The NSR is a strategically important trade artery, particularly since it can cut Asia-Europe shipping distances by as much as 40 percent against the Suez route (Pham 2026). As sea ice continues to retreat and traffic increases, interest in the route will only continue to grow (Pham 2026).

Control of the NSR is therefore the central question. Through its 2012 Federal Law and 2022 Maritime Doctrine, Russia defined the NSR as sovereign internal waters, subject to its own navigation rules (Dervovic et al. 2025). Invoking Article 234 of UNCLOS, it lists several demands to route users, including prior authorisation and icebreaker escorts (Pham 2026). This prompts fears that Russia could use control of the route as political leverage if tensions escalate (Pham 2026). Japan must thus both contain and depend on the same power that governs its most important emerging trade corridor (Devyatkin 2026).

A further pressure is the integration of the NSR into a joint Sino-Russian project. In 2017, Russia and China agreed to develop the route as a critical shipping corridor under the "New Silk Road" (Bhardwaj 2025; Tanaka 2026). Since then, Russia's Rosatom and China's Hainan Yangpu New Shipping Co. have agreed to jointly build ice-class vessels for year-round NSR operation, and China has invested heavily in route logistics, including icebreakers, several Russian Arctic ports, and rail infrastructure (Bhardwaj 2025; Pham 2026). Japan increasingly reads this as a route being knit into a joint military-strategic system, a development it regards as directly threatening its security (Bhardwaj 2025). Tokyo's own response leans more towards caution than escalation. The Fourth Basic Plan of 2023 reframed the NSR away from a strong economic opportunity in 2013 towards a more "cautious approach," folding it into a "Comprehensive Maritime Security" frame focused on information-gathering and preparedness for all scenarios rather than commercial promotion (Kimura 2026).

Sino-Russian Military Convergence and the Militarisation of the Arctic

If the NSR shows Russia and China converging commercially, their military cooperation is increasing too. In 2018, China declared itself a "near-Arctic state" and folded the region into its national security strategy (Šimov 2026). The two have conducted joint naval navigations in the Bering Sea since 2022, in addition to a joint flight with long-range bombers over the Arctic in July 2025 (CAO 2025). In 2023, the two deepened coast-guard cooperation, and Chinese coast guard vessels entered the Arctic Ocean for the first time in October 2025 (Dervovic et al. 2025; CAO 2025). In response to the rapid advancements in Sino-Russian cooperation, in addition to other factors including NATO expansion and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Japan’s Cabinet Office called for a revision of Japan’s 2015 Arctic Policy in December 2025 (CAO 2025).

Tokyo's concern stems not from any single event but from the cumulative architecture Russia and China are building. The core of its concern stems from increasing military activity, deepening intelligence cooperation, and the spread of dual-use infrastructure such as ports and airfields (Bhardwaj 2025). Compounding this, the Arctic has seen a rise in grey-zone tactics, including interference with seabed cables (Ander 2026).

Energy

Alongside these security pressures, energy dependency shapes Japan's entire Arctic strategy. It imports nearly 96 percent of its energy, with Russian LNG a structural part of that supply: Russia was its third-largest LNG supplier in 2023, at 9.3 percent of LNG imports, while energy made up close to 70 percent of Japan's total imports from Russia (Pham 2026; Bhardwaj 2025). This supply is drawn especially from projects in which Japanese firms such as Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and JOGMEC hold significant stakes, including Sakhalin-1, Sakhalin-2, and Arctic LNG 2 (Bhardwaj 2025; Šimov 2026). Although Japan joined Western condemnation and sanctions after Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, it did not exit these positions, with then-Prime Minister Fumio Kishida calling Russian LNG "extremely important" to Japan's energy security (Šimov 2026; Devyatkin 2026). The significance for Japan has also been understood in Washington, with Japan being granted a US sanctions waiver to continue imports from Sakhalin 2 until December 2026 (Pham 2026; Interfax 2026). Some analysts read this less as weakness than as a calculation to counter China: Chinese firms already hold 20 percent stakes in the Yamal and Arctic LNG 2 projects, and Japan fears that exiting would let China expand ownership and accelerate Sino-Russian energy integration (Šimov 2026). The tension that Japan faces between energy pragmatism and geopolitical values is real, and shapes its posture and room to act in the Arctic. This is a dilemma South Korea shares, as later discussion will show.

The Soya Strait: A Strategic Chokepoint

The most direct indicator of the regional pressure Japan is facing is the vulnerability of the Soya (La Pérouse) Strait, a 42-kilometre-wide maritime chokepoint between Japan’s Hokkaido and Russian-held Sakhalin (Zellen 2026a). Linking the Sea of Japan and Northeast Asia to emerging Arctic sea lanes like the NSR, the strait has been increasingly navigated by both Russian and Chinese warships in recent years (Zellen 2026b). This vulnerability is compounded by Japan's own defence posture. A decade or more of concentrating its defence investment against Chinese maritime expansion in the south and east has left Hokkaido and its north comparatively under-resourced (Tatsumi 2025). Analysts argue that if regional tensions increase, the strait could severely choke NSR traffic bound for Europe, and that a fight over Hokkaido could trigger naval combat on a scale the region has not seen since 1945 (Zellen 2026a). 

While these pressures describe what the Arctic means for Japan, the relationship also runs the other way. Japan is not only acted upon by the region but brings distinct assets to it, including scientific legitimacy built over decades, concrete technological and maritime capability, and an increasingly active security posture.

Institutional Legitimacy Rooted in Science

Japan has scientifically engaged with the Arctic longer than any other Asian nation. It has conducted scientific observation there since the 1950s, and in 1991 opened a permanent Svalbard observation station, the first by any non-Arctic state (Study Group for the Future of the Arctic 2017; Pham 2026). Its long-standing relationship with the Arctic has translated into Japan having institutional access: today Japan sits across several working groups and scientific bodies that shape Arctic affairs.

Through its Arctic Challenge for Sustainability programmes - ArCS (2015–2020), ArCS II (2020–2025), and forthcoming ArCS III - Japan has built a research network anchored by institutions like the National Institute of Polar Research, JAMSTEC, and the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) that ties natural- and social-science research to Arctic policy-relevant outputs (Saccone 2026). It previously shaped the Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement through scientific negotiation and sits on Arctic Council bodies, including the Emergency Prevention, Preparedness, and Response working group (Villa and Grissler 2026; Kimura 2026). Scholars call this type of presence "liminal diplomacy": by building norms for cooperation, transparency, and trust, Japan is helping to define the rules of an order still taking shape through scientific engagement (Villa and Grissler 2026). Despite China’s vastly bigger financial pocket and aggressive posture in the Arctic, Japan’s engagement through science has allowed it to maintain a credible regional presence while deepening its cooperation with partners (Saccone 2026). Furthermore, this normative posture extends beyond its scientific engagement. Through its Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy, increasingly being applied to the Arctic, Japan's advocacy for UNCLOS, freedom of navigation, and multilateral rule-making stands in stark contrast with Russia's sovereignty claims and China's investments in dual-use infrastructure, positioning Tokyo not just as a participant in Arctic governance but also as a shaper of its future norms (Pham 2026; Kimura 2026; Saccone 2026).

Concrete Capabilities 

Beyond legitimacy and norms, Japan also brings tangible capabilities. JAXA's AMSR2 and ALOS-2/PALSAR-2 satellites produce a continuous feed on ice size, ice drift, and how Arctic coastlines are changing, valuable input that scientists, shippers, and insurers rely on (Yu 2026). Its Michibiki (QZSS) positioning constellation integrates easily with European systems, also making Japan a ready partner to the Nordic space cluster forming around Norway and Sweden (Ander 2026). Japan’s Arctic maritime capabilities are growing too, with the new icebreaking research vessel Mirai II greatly expanding its ability to operate and conduct research in Arctic waters independently (Yamanouchi 2025). Furthermore, the country is also central to the construction of a trans-Arctic submarine cable network, the EU–Japan-backed Far North Fiber and Polar Connect projects, that will add a new resilient, lower-latency Asia–Europe data connection (Saunavaara 2026; Ander 2026).

A Security Shift in Policy

Although Japan long treated the Arctic mainly as a domain for science and trade, since 2022 security has increased in its policy priorities. Its 2022 National Security Strategy (NSS) referenced the need to address Arctic security for the first time, linking it to maritime security and to the increased use of the Northern Sea Route driven by climate change (Government of Japan 2022). The NSS frames China as a power seeking to revise the status quo and Russia as a violator of sovereignty, treating both as a single threat to maritime order, a sign that Tokyo now regards the Arctic as a domain demanding active attention (Pham 2026).

Practical signals in the Arctic, both before and since this shift, reflect Japan’s security-oriented thinking. Since 2022, Japan’s Self-Defense Forces have participated with observer status in Operation Nanook, an annual sovereignty operation and exercise conducted by the Canadian Armed Forces with allies and partners in the Arctic, and are expected to become a full participant following the 2026 Japan-Canada Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (Yamanouchi 2025; Chase 2026). Japan also joins regularly scheduled joint exercises with the United States, including the cold-weather exercise Northern Viper (Villa and Grissler 2026).

Cooperation with European partners has deepened too: through Japan’s Northern European Diplomacy Initiative, launched in January 2024, the Arctic Ocean and Security and Defence were unveiled as two of four main areas of focus for deepening Japan’s cooperation with Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Iceland and Finland (Press 2024; Tatsumi 2025). As Japan has had unique experience in managing the dual Russia-China challenge, the Nordic states have shown eagerness to draw on this knowledge and have each signed bilateral strategic partnerships with it (Ander 2026).

Japan's increasing policy focus on the Arctic is also shaped by the wider security environment. The US's Arctic strategy is currently being reformulated, with President Trump increasingly placing interest on restoring US power and deepening cooperation in the region, for example with Finland on icebreaker construction (CAO 2025). As part of this focus, cooperation with Japan is very much prioritised, with witnesses in a US Senate subcommittee hearing on Arctic security emphasising the importance of the US demonstrating a joint presence with Japan and South Korea in the region (Watanabe 2026).

South Korea: Energy Diversification and Economic Opportunity

South Korea's Arctic engagement rests on two pillars: a set of commercial drivers rooted in energy security and trade, and a latent maritime power grounded in its shipbuilding industry. Like Japan, it is both shaped by the region and increasingly able to shape it. 

In 1993, with the launch of formal Arctic surveying and research, South Korea demonstrated its early interest in the region (Tingstad 2026). This interest in the Arctic has continued and gradually grown into the present day, centred around the desire to take advantage of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) to export goods to Europe, one of its primary markets (Tingstad 2026). With the accelerated decline of sea ice along this route, South Korea’s interest in the region has gradually grown as these routes become increasingly viable (Arctic Institute 2022). 

South Korea set up the Korean Arctic Science Council and started independent Arctic research in 2001, joined the International Arctic Science Committee and opened the Dasan research station through the Korean Polar Research Institute in Svalbard in 2002, and began operating the Araon, its first icebreaker, in 2009 (Kim, B. 2026). South Korea remains an active participant in polar research today, and has signed a contract for a next-generation icebreaking research vessel which will enter service by summer 2030, marking a further commitment to its scientific presence (Georgiou 2025).  

South Korea formalised its polar (Arctic and Antarctic) engagement in the Polar Activities Promotion Act of 2021, which requires the South Korean Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries to produce a five-year plan for polar activities and commits the state to promoting Arctic economic activity, including the development of the Arctic route, environmental protection, and international cooperation (Korea Legislation Research Institute 2021). Across the succession of its five-year frameworks since gaining Arctic Council observer status in 2013, South Korea, much like Japan, has steadily recast itself from a conventional middle power into what it terms a "pivot power," using scientific diplomacy and multilateral engagement to bridge Arctic and non-Arctic states without causing friction geopolitically (Patel 2025). South Korea’s Arctic objectives accurately reflect the fundamental contradiction that exists in Arctic management. While it recognises the importance of sustainable development and environmental responsibility, Seoul also recognises that the rapidly changing climate represents opportunities for economic growth and trade diversification (Kim, B. 2026). By participating in international scientific cooperation and collaboration, South Korea reinforces its role as a responsible stakeholder in the Arctic (Kim, J. 2026). South Korea has engaged with all Arctic countries and many observer states in its business and scientific endeavours, further highlighting this role (Arctic Institute 2022). 

Due to its proximity and its centrality to the NSR, a deteriorating relationship between Russia and South Korea since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has had major ramifications for South Korea’s posture in the Arctic. South Korea’s Arctic strategy is inherently tied to cooperation with Russia, and as this becomes increasingly volatile, there is the risk of disruption in relations in terms of NSR access and LNG supply, which could impact South Korea’s energy security and core objectives in the Arctic (Khorrami 2024). 

Commercial Drivers: Energy Security and Alternative Trade Routes

Being one of the world’s leading energy importers, 97 percent of South Korea’s energy consumption relied on imports in 2015 (Arctic Institute 2022). Of these imports, 84 percent of liquid fuels consumed originate from the Middle East (Arctic Institute 2022). As a result, for some time, South Korea has been looking to diversify its reliance on Middle Eastern energy. Never has this been more timely, as the Iran conflict’s effective blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has clogged up the chokepoint that traffics 70 percent of South Korea’s crude oil imports (Cha and Lim 2026). This energy vulnerability represents a difficult trade-off for South Korea as it looks north. While the NSR would remove the reliance on volatile Middle Eastern shipping routes, it also presents the risk of an increased reliance on Russia for South Korea. As previously mentioned, South Korea’s Arctic ambitions are inherently tied to Russia’s. This is signalled by South Korea’s National Logistics Master Plan 2016-2025, which emphasises cooperation with Russia, supporting its keen interest in diversifying energy reliance away from the Middle East and towards Russian LNG (Khorrami 2024). In turn, Russia benefits by fulfilling its desire to exploit the economic potential of its Arctic region, its next energy hub. This symbiotic relationship is at risk, with both sides facing challenges. For South Korea, this means risking access to energy and shipping routes; for Russia, it risks its ambition to further commodify the region (Khorrami 2024). Importantly, the Korea Maritime Institute describes Arctic shipping as a strategic nexus linking the NSR to its domestic industry, particularly through its Maritime Capital Region Strategy, a plan to build a maritime economic hub around the port cities of Busan and Ulsan (Tingstad 2026). This is notable because growth in Arctic traffic could revitalise shipbuilding and logistics and generate jobs in these ports, which have been hit by lost investment and outmigration in recent years (Tingstad 2026).

Beyond importing as the basis for South Korean energy infrastructure, it sees huge export potential and opportunity in Arctic shipping, pledging over US$400 million to it (Frederiksen 2026). Given South Korea’s export-driven economy, geopolitical disruptions and extreme weather events have necessitated that South Korea explore alternative shipping routes to export its goods to global markets (Patel 2025). Reduced shipping and fuel costs associated with the shorter NSR route offer far more efficient logistics, while also reducing dependency on the volatility of current supply chain options. Together, these factors mean the NSR could represent a more reliable alternative.

Industrial Presence and Latent Maritime Power

While military capability in the Arctic is excluded, probably deliberately, from South Korea’s current Plan for Stimulating Activities in the Polar Regions (2023-2027), it certainly has a role to play as a shipbuilding powerhouse with experience building icebreaking-capable ships (Patel 2025). Notably, Seoul's longer-term 2050 Polar Vision does not mention any reference to defence or security, signalling a deliberate choice to tie South Korean Arctic engagement to science, sustainability, and non-militarised cooperation (Patel 2025). South Korea is interested in the economic potential of being a specialist in Arctic navigation technologies, capitalising on the regional necessity for special vessels and related technologies (Arctic Institute 2022). Only behind China, South Korea represents the second-largest market share of constructing ice-class LNG carriers and polar-ready tankers (Patel 2025). Korean shipyards built the icebreaking LNG carriers for Russia's Yamal project, supplying the technical expertise behind one of the Arctic's flagship energy developments before sanctions post-2022 restricted the partnership (Kim, J. 2026). Beyond ships, South Korea is a major producer of submarines, which are increasingly becoming important for Arctic power projection. This is why South Korea can be described as a “latent maritime power”. The country possesses the core attributes to make it a leading sea power, especially in the far north. Hanwha Ocean, the company tasked with building South Korea’s aforementioned next-generation research icebreaker, has said that this project represents more than polar research, reflecting a long-term national strategy which plans to increase its focus on icebreaker construction in response to the growing strategic value of the Arctic region amidst intensifying competition for its dominance (Georgiou 2025). This is further reflected by President Lee Jae Myung’s massive US$1.3 billion pledge towards upgrading the country's southeastern port infrastructure, made in 2025 (Humpert 2025). Furthermore, in 2025 the Lee Jae Myung government designated Arctic shipping routes a pillar of its long-term economic agenda and relocated the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries to Busan, solidifying the port’s role as the country's maritime and logistics hub (Kim, J. 2026). Included in this funding are further subsidies for leading shipbuilders. 

Even though policymakers in Seoul maintain a position of relative neutrality in the Arctic, based on the aforementioned scientific and commercial incentives, its industrial capacity for Arctic-capable equipment means that it can function as a vital structural counterweight to expanding Chinese and Russian presence in the far north. The geopolitical significance of this industrial capability means that South Korea has the opportunity to emerge as the leading democratic alternative to China’s ice-capable shipbuilders. This is demonstrated by the Canadian government’s consideration of Hanwha’s KSS-III submarine, alongside Germany's ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems, for its Canadian Patrol Submarine Project, which seeks up to twelve Arctic-capable vessels to bolster its ability to defend its extensive Arctic coastline from growing subsea threats (Bentley and Kim 2026). 

By offering competitive and reliable production of specialised Arctic vessels, South Korea can embed itself within Western security infrastructure, without having to explicitly deepen or deploy its own far north military capabilities, effectively maintaining its position of general neutrality. This is no mistake, as South Korea’s value lies directly in placing itself as the democratic shipbuilder the West can rely on to source from within existing security cooperation.

Conclusion

Put side by side, South Korea and Japan reveal more similarities than differences when it comes to the Arctic. Both countries import an overwhelming amount of their energy (roughly 96-97 percent respectively), both gained Arctic Council observer status in the same year, 2013, both rank among the world’s leading shipbuilders, and both built their early strategies for the Arctic around a Russia that has since turned into a liability that they must hedge against, particularly after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Where the two differ is in their posture. Japan has increasingly integrated the Arctic into its security architecture, linking it to its alliances and partnerships and its threat perception of Sino-Russian convergence. South Korea has deliberately kept defence out of its polar policy, opting to channel its influence through shipyards, icebreakers, and scientific collaboration. The result is two routes that are leading to the same destination, namely increased relevance in the region.

With no territorial claims above the Arctic Circle, no seat as a full member on the Arctic Council, and no Arctic coastline, Japan and South Korea are not becoming Arctic powers in the traditional sense. But perhaps a reflection worth having is whether, as the Arctic region increases in global interest, the term “Arctic power” is losing influence. While Arctic powers (states with territory and power in the Arctic) remain central to the discussion, a broader recognition of states, with or without Arctic territory, that are increasingly shaping the region’s governance norms, security architecture, infrastructure, and alignments is needed. This broader recognition matters because, as external states continue to expand their presence, the cohesion and adaptability of the Arctic Council, the region's primary forum for cooperation, will become increasingly important to preserving a stable, rules-based order.

Japan and South Korea's own trajectories illustrate this stake in the Council's future. With a revision of Japan’s 2015 Arctic Policy framework upcoming, the decisions that will concretely define Japan’s role in the Arctic are not yet made. However, Japan’s trajectory in the region is clear: Japan is no longer a distant observer of Arctic affairs, but increasingly a state participating in shaping the region. The same can be said for South Korea: with its next-generation icebreaking research vessel due to enter service by 2030 and Arctic shipping now designated a pillar of the country's long-term economic agenda, the state is neither a distant observer nor a conventional power, but one that is quietly embedding itself deeper into the Arctic's commercial and strategic future. Together, South Korea and Japan’s differing approaches to their Arctic presence and engagement within international structures have provided a critical counterweight to the deepening Sino-Russian “no limits friendship”. In doing so, these nations have demonstrated that the future of Arctic governance will also increasingly depend on non-Arctic states as the region becomes more important for global trade, investment and security.

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