Executive Summary
Even if Russia’s war against Ukraine ends or de-escalates, Moscow is unlikely to return to the model of ‘Arctic exceptionalism’ understood as a stable space for cooperation, insulated from great power rivalry. This is because Russian Arctic policy was never a project of regional cooperation, but a conditional concept of peace in which the region’s stability was to be based on recognition of Moscow’s privileged position. For Russia, the Arctic remains a strategic, economic and symbolic space: it serves to protect the maritime component of nuclear deterrence, secure the Northern Fleet, control the Northern Sea Route, exploit natural resources, and affirm Russia’s status as a global power.
The war with Ukraine has weakened some of Russia’s conventional capabilities, including units associated with the Far North. Still, it has not removed the structural reasons for Russia’s military presence in the region. On the contrary, the more Russia’s relations with the West take the form of systemic confrontation, the more firmly the Arctic becomes embedded in Russian strategic planning. Consequently, NATO countries should treat the current period not as a harbinger of lasting de-escalation, but as a time-limited window to strengthen their own deterrence and resilience architecture in the High North.
The most important conclusion is that Russian weakness in the Arctic following the war with Ukraine may be a reality, but it will not be tantamount to abandoning Arctic militarisation. Moscow will rebuild its Arctic capabilities unevenly, prioritising those related to nuclear deterrence, the protection of its bastion, and control of strategic routes, whilst capabilities that demand complex conventional regeneration, modern technologies, and trained personnel will be rebuilt more slowly.
1. Introduction: The Misguided Question of a Return to ‘Arctic Exceptionalism’
The debate over the future of Russian Arctic policy following the war with Ukraine frequently starts with the question of whether Moscow will return to the previous model of regional cooperation. However, framing the issue in this way is misleading. It assumes that, prior to 2022, Russia treated the Arctic as a space genuinely separate from strategic rivalry with the West. In reality, Russia’s understanding of Arctic exceptionalism differed from the outset from the Western conception of the Arctic as a region of low tension. It did not signify a renunciation of geopolitics, but rather an attempt to impose a geopolitical order in which Russia’s dominant position remains unchallenged.
Russia’s ‘Arctic exceptionalism’ was not a promise to keep the Arctic out of geopolitics; it was a claim that geopolitics in the Arctic should take place on Russia’s terms. In this sense, Russian Arctic policy combined an official narrative of peace and cooperation with a parallel rebuilding of military infrastructure, the development of anti-access systems, the strengthening of the Northern Fleet, and the increasing securitisation of the Northern Sea Route (FPC 2016, 76; FPC 2023, 50; FSPA 2020, 5b; SDAZ 2020, 16).
The war against Ukraine did not, therefore, create a new logic for Russian Arctic policy, but rather accelerated the revelation of its earlier assumptions. As early as the first decade of the 21st century, Russian strategic documents and political practice indicated that the Arctic was treated as significant in military, economic and identity-political terms. After 2014, and especially after 2022, it was primarily the language that changed: neutral cooperation features less prominently, whilst rivalry, threats, control of infrastructure and preparation for a potential confrontation with the West feature more prominently (FPC 2016, 76; FPC 2023, 50.2–50.3; NSS 2021, 101.17; MarD 2022, 22.8; SDAZ 2020, 4zh, 7t).
2. Russian Arctic Exceptionalism as a Project of Status
In Western interpretations, the concept of ‘Arctic exceptionalism’ often refers to the belief that the Arctic could remain a region of cooperation despite tensions elsewhere. In the Russian perspective, however, ‘exceptionalism’ had a different meaning. The Arctic was presented as a space of special destiny for Russia, its historical mission, sovereignty and great-power status. This is precisely why one cannot analyse Russia’s presence in the Arctic solely through the prism of resource, transport, or military calculations. One must also take into account the dimension of ontological security, namely the need to affirm the state’s enduring identity as a superpower capable of controlling vast territories, projecting power, and competing with the United States (Lamazhapov and Moe 2024, 604; Sergunin 2024, 638; Laruelle 2014, 254). In this context, the ‘Arcticism’ metanarrative is especially important. In Russian nationalist narratives, the Far North is frequently portrayed as the final frontier for expansion, a ‘tabula rasa’, and an opportunity for symbolic redemption for the loss of imperial status following the collapse of the Soviet Union (Laruelle 2013, 558, 567–568). The Arctic thus serves a compensatory function: it allows Russian political and ideological elites to speak of the loss of the empire not as the end of great power status, but as a shift of its geographical centre towards the North.
This symbolic function is not simply a propaganda add-on to security policy. In Putin’s system, status and security are closely intertwined. If Russia defines itself as a civilisation-state, a nuclear power and a sovereign pole of the international order, then the loss of its ability to dominate the Arctic would be perceived as a threat not only to its hard security but also to its very identity. Therefore, Russia’s militarisation of the region cannot be reduced to technical modernisation following the collapse of the 1990s. It is also a political and symbolic representation of ‘Russia’s return’ (Sergunin 2024, 638; Lamazhapov and Moe 2024, 604; Laruelle 2014, 254).
3. From a Conditional Peace to Permanent Militarisation
For many years, Russia declared that the Arctic should remain a ‘territory of peace, stability and constructive cooperation’ (SDAZ 2020, 16). Such formulations appeared in strategic documents and in the statements of Russian diplomats. However, they should not be interpreted as evidence that Moscow rejected the logic of military rivalry. Russia’s ‘peace’ in the Arctic was conditional. It meant stability intended to serve Russian economic and strategic interests, but it did not entail equal participation by all actors in shaping the regional order.
Moscow accepted cooperation in the Arctic as long as it did not restrict its freedom of action, control over the Northern Sea Route, or its dominant military position. In Russian strategic discourse, a Western military presence, even if legal and limited, was often portrayed as a provocation, an attempt to encircle Russia, or a violation of its sphere of privileged interests (Zysk 2019, 690, 706–707; Gubin 2022). In this way, cooperation and militarisation were not treated as mutually exclusive options, but as two instruments of the same strategy.
This dualism is particularly evident since 2014. The annexation of Crimea, the war in Donbas and the deterioration of relations with the West led to a hardening of Russian security rhetoric. After 2022, this process became even more pronounced. In a situation where the Russian authorities portray the conflict with the West as a clash of civilisations, the Arctic can no longer be credibly described as a space politically isolated from other dimensions of rivalry. From the Russian perspective, it is one of the fronts in a broader struggle for status, resources, freedom of action and deterrence capability.
4. The Bastion, Nuclear Deterrence, and the Strategic Vulnerability of the Kola Peninsula
The concept of the bastion remains the most important military element of Russian Arctic policy. Its essence rests in the protection of strategic ballistic missile submarines, which provide Russia with the capability for a nuclear retaliatory strike. In Russian strategic thinking, the Kola Peninsula, the Barents Sea, and the Northern Fleet's infrastructure are therefore not simply elements of a regional military presence. They are among the foundations of global nuclear deterrence (Nae 2022, 373–374; Kobzeva 2020, 339; Kipp 2019, 622–623). For Russia, the Arctic is not a periphery, but a strategic hinterland for the survival of the state in the event of a potential war with NATO. Protecting the maritime component of Russia’s nuclear forces requires a multi-layered defence: submarine and surface forces, aviation, air defence and missile defence systems, radar infrastructure, electronic warfare capabilities, and anti-access systems (Ruiz Palmer 2015, 60; Covington 2016, 114). Russia’s expansion of military infrastructure in the Arctic involves both the restoration of former Soviet installations and the construction of new capabilities. This applies to bases, airfields, S-300 and S-400 systems, Pantsir-S1 systems, Bastion coastal systems, modernised MiG-31 aircraft, early-warning radars, and communications and reconnaissance infrastructure (Zysk 2019; Westerlund and Norberg 2016, 82). These elements constitute a system whose aim is not only to defend the Russian coastline but also to restrict NATO’s freedom of action in the region and safeguard Russian strategic assets.
5. The GIUK Gap, the North Atlantic, and the Threat to Transatlantic Lines of Communication
The significance of Russia’s militarisation of the Arctic is not limited to the defence of the Kola Peninsula, the Barents Sea and the infrastructure of the Northern Fleet. In the event of a crisis or war with NATO, Russia’s presence in the Arctic takes on a transatlantic dimension, as it enables influence over the area between the Norwegian Sea, the North Atlantic and the GIUK Gap – that is, the Greenland–Iceland–United Kingdom corridor. For Russia, the Arctic is not only a defensive bastion but also an operational gateway to the North Atlantic.
The GIUK Gap is crucial to NATO, as maritime communication lines connecting North America and Europe run through the North Atlantic. In the event of a major European crisis, the ability of the United States and Canada to deploy forces, equipment and supplies to the European continent would depend on maintaining the security of these routes. From this perspective, Russian investments in submarines, long-range systems, reconnaissance, long-range aviation and strike assets deployed in the Arctic should not be interpreted solely as regional defence modernisation. They are also part of a potential strategy to disrupt or delay transatlantic military support for Europe (Pincus 2020). In Russian strategic planning, the Northern Fleet thus plays a dual role. Firstly, it protects nuclear naval forces as part of a bastion strategy. Secondly, it retains the capability to project power beyond the immediate defence zone of the Russian coastline. This means that Russian submarines, armed with cruise missiles and capable of operating in the North Atlantic, could, in a conflict scenario, threaten NATO’s lines of communication, critical infrastructure and ports receiving support from North America (Khomkin 2020).
The GIUK Gap is therefore the point of contact between Russia’s bastion defence and its offensive potential to disrupt NATO’s ability to wage war in Europe. This does not mean that Russia would necessarily seek permanent control over the North Atlantic. A more likely and dangerous scenario would be limited, selective pressure: demonstrative submarine sorties beyond the bastion, actions below the threshold of war, threats to undersea infrastructure, testing NATO’s response, or an attempt to temporarily tie up significant Alliance resources in the maritime domain.
6. The Northern Sea Route as an Economic Corridor and Strategic Artery
The second key element of Russian Arctic policy is the Northern Sea Route. In Russian documents, it is sometimes presented as a ‘national transport route’ and a tool for economic development. This interpretation is partly justified. The Russian Arctic region is of immense importance for raw materials: it accounts for the bulk of the country’s natural gas production and a significant share of its oil production. Arctic LNG projects, ports, icebreakers, and transmission infrastructure are therefore vital to the Russian economy and to the reorientation of exports towards Asia (SDAZ 2020, 5).
At the same time, it would be a mistake to treat the Northern Sea Route (NSR) solely as an economic project. In Russia’s strategy, the NSR is simultaneously a trade route, a tool of sovereignty, a corridor for military mobility and an element of geopolitical leverage against other states. The development of port infrastructure, navigation systems, communications, icebreakers and dual-use facilities strengthens not only the export of raw materials but also the state’s ability to control the area and move forces along the northern coast (FPC 2013, 73; FPC 2016, 76; FSPA 2020, 5d; FPC 2023, 50; MarD 2022, 22.8).
After 2022, the significance of the Northern Sea Route has increased further. Sanctions, the curtailment of economic relations with the West, and the growing importance of Asian markets have made the Russian Arctic even more closely linked to the state’s economic survival policy. For Moscow, the NSR is therefore simultaneously a development project, an instrument for reducing dependence on the West, and an element of a wider geopolitical strategy.
7. The War with Ukraine and the Pace of Russia’s Arctic Capability Rebuilding
The war against Ukraine has caused a tangible degradation of some of Russia’s military capabilities related to the Arctic, particularly in the conventional sphere. The redeployment of units from the Far North to the Ukrainian front, personnel and equipment losses, and pressure on the Russian defence industry have limited the ability to rapidly develop a full military posture in the High North. At the same time, not all components of Russia’s Arctic presence have been affected to the same extent. Land-based Arctic units must be assessed differently from air defence systems, base infrastructure, submarine capabilities, the Northern Fleet's strategic vessels, and the nuclear deterrent component (Bouffard et al. 2025). The Russian rebuilding of Arctic capabilities will not be a linear process: the capabilities most closely linked to nuclear deterrence and the protection of the bastion will be restored most quickly, whilst those requiring modern technologies, trained personnel and the rebuilding of depleted conventional resources will take longer. Therefore, rather than a single timetable, three distinct horizons of reconstruction should be distinguished.
In the short term, covering roughly 1–3 years, Russia will primarily seek to maintain capabilities that it cannot afford to neglect, either politically or strategically. This concerns the defence of the Kola Peninsula, the readiness of the Northern Fleet, the security of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), early warning systems, selected elements of Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD), and infrastructure enabling control of air and sea space. Even if some land-based units have been weakened by the war, the Russian command will treat the nuclear component and its protection as a top priority.
In the medium term, spanning approximately 3–7 years, a gradual rebuild of selected conventional capabilities is possible. This applies primarily to land forces adapted for Arctic operations, logistical capabilities, base infrastructure, reconnaissance, electronic warfare, air defence, and mobility elements along the Northern Sea Route. The scale of this rebuild, however, will depend on several factors: the outcome of Russia’s war against Ukraine, the severity of sanctions, access to technological components, the state of the Russian defence industry, and the level of China’s involvement in infrastructure and energy projects. It is precisely this medium-term horizon – roughly 3–7 years – that should be viewed as a crucial window of opportunity for the West. During this time, NATO can most effectively strengthen capabilities whose reconstruction on the Russian side will be expensive and time-consuming: underwater reconnaissance, Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), port and airport infrastructure, capabilities for operating in extreme conditions, the resilience of critical infrastructure, and the integration of Nordic planning with the defence of the North Atlantic.
In the long term, Russia may attempt to rebuild a more ambitious Arctic posture, combining nuclear deterrence, advanced conventional capabilities, military mobility, protection of the Northern Sea Route, and power projection towards the North Atlantic. However, it is by no means certain that this rebuilding will be entirely successful. Russia’s reconstitution will be constrained by demographics, resource depletion during the war, technological sanctions, budgetary competition between theatres of operations, and the need to maintain high expenditure on the war or on the post-war reconstruction of its land forces.
For NATO, the issue is not simply whether Russia will regain full capability to wage war in the Arctic, but whether it will be able to use selected Arctic capabilities to destabilise the wider Euro-Atlantic security environment.
8. China: Support, Constraint, and a Source of Strategic Tension
China’s increasing importance in the Arctic complicates Russia’s strategy. On the one hand, Beijing is helping Moscow to mitigate the effects of its isolation from the West. Chinese capital, technology, demand for raw materials and interest in northern routes can support Russian infrastructure and energy projects. Faced with sanctions and limited access to Western technology, Russia increasingly needs Asian partners.
On the other hand, the Chinese presence undermines Russia’s ideology of Arctic exceptionalism. China describes itself as a ‘near-Arctic’ state and is interested in the internationalisation of the region’s routes, research and resources. For Russia, this is convenient only to a certain extent. Moscow needs China, but does not want the Arctic to become a space where Beijing gains autonomous strategic influence. Russian-Chinese cooperation in the Arctic is therefore asymmetrical and ambivalent: it strengthens Russia’s short-term resilience but, in the long term, limits its claim to exclusive dominance (Fravel, Lavelle, and Odgaard 2022). In recent years, elements of practical security cooperation have also become apparent. In 2024, a joint patrol by the Chinese and Russian coastguards took place in the Bering Sea region, and in July 2024, Russian and Chinese bombers conducted a joint flight near Alaska. This does not yet signify the formation of a full-fledged Russian-Chinese Arctic alliance. Still, it indicates a gradual shift in cooperation from declarations and the economy towards practical forms of operational presence.
The issue of Chinese underwater and unmanned technologies requires particular caution. Publicly available sources show that China is developing capabilities for underwater research and operations in the Arctic, including the use of submersibles and systems to support exploration beneath the ice. However, there is insufficient evidence to claim that Chinese underwater systems are already integrated into Russian military planning in the Arctic. A more cautious and analytically sound argument is that Chinese underwater capabilities do not yet directly alter the military balance in the Arctic. Still, they do increase the long-term potential for reconnaissance, infrastructure and technological cooperation between Beijing and Moscow.
For the West, this leads to a twofold conclusion. Firstly, Russian-Chinese patrol activities should not be underestimated, as they normalise China’s presence in a region that Russia has hitherto regarded as particularly sensitive. Secondly, the cohesion of this partnership should not be overestimated. Russia may need China, but it does not want the strategic internationalisation of the Arctic. China, for its part, may support Russia, but its long-term goal is access and influence rather than recognition of Russian exclusivity.
9. Implications for the West’s Security Architecture in the High North
Russia’s rebuilding of its Arctic capabilities requires a multidimensional response from the West. This is not merely a matter of increasing military presence in the region, but of building a coherent architecture of deterrence, reconnaissance, resilience and escalation management. The West’s strategy towards Russia’s reconstitution in the Arctic should be based on the assumption that the region will become increasingly integrated into the broader confrontation between Russia and NATO, but will not simply mirror the land front in Eastern Europe.
The priority should be to strengthen anti-submarine capabilities. Russian submarines are a key tool for both defending the bastion and potentially projecting power into the North Atlantic. NATO should develop permanent and rotational ASW capabilities, underwater sensor systems, maritime aviation patrols, interoperability among the Nordic states, and the ability to rapidly detect Russian vessels leaving the Barents Sea.
The second priority is the protection of subsea and energy infrastructure. Communication cables, pipelines, LNG terminals, ports, airports, navigation systems and energy installations are becoming potential targets for sub-threshold operations. In the Arctic and the North Atlantic, this infrastructure is particularly vulnerable due to distances, harsh climatic conditions and the limited density of a permanent military presence.
The third priority is the full integration of Finland and Sweden into NATO’s planning in the High North. The accession of both countries to the Alliance has fundamentally altered the region's security landscape. NATO points out that seven of the eight Arctic states now belong to the Alliance, which gives it significantly greater capacity for coordination but also increases its responsibility for the region’s stability (NATO 2026). The Western security architecture should draw on Finland’s and Sweden’s expertise in winter operations, territorial defence, societal resilience, reserve mobilisation, and the protection of critical infrastructure.
The fourth priority is multi-domain reconnaissance: satellite, aerial, maritime, underwater, cyber and intelligence. The Arctic is a region where a lack of situational awareness can lead to a misjudgment of the adversary’s intentions. NATO should therefore develop capabilities not only to respond but, above all, to detect early changes in Russia’s posture: submarine movements, air activity, infrastructure construction, deployment of missile systems, and hybrid operations.
The fifth priority is logistics. Operating in the Arctic requires prepared ports, airports, and warehouses; transport capabilities for difficult conditions; equipment resistant to extreme temperatures; and trained personnel. Without this, even advanced weapon systems will have limited utility. NATO should therefore treat infrastructure and mobility as elements of deterrence, rather than merely as technical support.
The final priority concerns political feasibility and escalation management. Strengthening NATO’s presence in the Arctic must be sufficient to deter Russia while remaining calibrated to avoid unnecessarily increasing the risk of escalation. The West’s most effective strategy should combine hard military capabilities with predictable strategic communication: NATO should leave Russia in no doubt about its ability to defend the High North, while also avoiding giving Moscow an easy pretext to portray the Alliance as driving military escalation in the Arctic.
Conclusion
Russia will not return to Arctic exceptionalism after the war with Ukraine, because its own vision of the Arctic was never a project of equal, depoliticised cooperation. It was rather a conditional concept of stability, in which peace was to mean acceptance of Russian dominance. In this sense, the current militarisation is not a complete break with previous policy, but its logical extension in the context of open confrontation with the West.
For Russia, the Arctic will remain a space in which hard-security interests, energy resources, nuclear deterrence, control of sea lanes and great-power identity mutually reinforce one another. The war with Ukraine may delay the restoration of some of Russia’s capabilities, but it will not alter the region’s strategic significance. For NATO, therefore, the most important challenge is not whether Russia will immediately become capable of escalation in the Arctic, but whether the West will seize the current window of opportunity to build a sustainable, multi-domain and politically coherent security architecture in the High North.
Russia’s current weakness in the Arctic is a window of opportunity, not a guarantee of security. If NATO does not use this period to strengthen its anti-submarine capabilities, reconnaissance, critical infrastructure protection, Arctic logistics and the integration of Nordic planning with North Atlantic defence, Russia’s future resurgence could significantly constrain the Alliance’s freedom of action.
The West’s response should therefore be twofold. Firstly, it must recognise that the Arctic is no longer a space detached from Russia’s confrontation with NATO. Secondly, it must avoid a simple spiral of militarisation that would reinforce Russian narratives of threat and encirclement. The aim should not be to turn the Arctic into yet another front of escalation, but to create a deterrence architecture that prevents Russia from using the region for strategic blackmail, disrupting transatlantic lines of communication and destabilising European security.
References
Russian Strategic Documents
FPC 2013. Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (2013), http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/41d447a0ce9f5a96bdc3.pdf
FPC 2016. Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (2016), http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/41451/page/1
FPC 2023. Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (2023), http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/70811
FSPA 2020. Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic until 2035 (2020), http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/45255
MarD 2022. Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation (2022), https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/official_documents/1688734/
NSS 2021. National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation (2021), http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/47046
SDAZ 2020. Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and Ensuring National Security until 2035 (2020), http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/45972
Literature
Bouffard, Troy J., Lester W. Grau, Charles K. Bartles, and Mathieu Boulègue. 2025. "Russian Arctic Land Forces and Defense Trends Redefined by NATO and Ukraine." The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters 55 (3): 51–66. https://doi.org/10.55540/0031-1723.3356
Covington, Stephen R. 2016. The Culture of Strategic Thought Behind Russia's Modern Approaches to Warfare. Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School (Cambridge, MA). https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/culture-strategic-thought-behind-russias-modern-approaches-warfare
Fravel, M. Taylor, Kathryn Lavelle, and Liselotte Odgaard. 2022. "China engages the Arctic: a great power in a regime complex." Asian Security 18 (2): 138–158. https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2021.1986008
Gubin, Andrey. 2022. "Voyennye aspekty pozitsii Rossii v Arktike." Rossiyskiy sovet po mezhdunarodnym delam. https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/voennye-aspekty-pozitsii-rossii-v-arktike/
Khomkin, Anatoliy A. 2020. "Vozmozhnyye voyennyye ugrozy v Arktike v srednesrochnoy perspektive" Voyennaya mysl’ (5): 112–120. https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/vozmozhnye-voennye-ugrozy-v-arktike-v-srednesrochnoy-perspektive
Kipp, Jacob W. 2019. "Russian Naval Power Under Vladimir Putin." In The Russian Military in Contemporary Perspective, edited by Stephen J. Blank, 575–685. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press. https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/907
Kobzeva, Mariia. 2020. "Strategic partnership setting for Sino-Russian cooperation in Arctic shipping." The Polar Journal 10 (2): 334–352. https://doi.org/10.1080/2154896x.2020.1810956.
Lamazhapov, Erdem, and Arild Moe. 2024. "Russia’s Geopolitical Position in the Arctic: What’s New?" Strategic Analysis 48 (6): 604–618. https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2025.2459571
Laruelle, Marlene. 2013. "Larger, Higher, Farther North…Geographical Metanarratives of the Nation in Russia." Eurasian Geography and Economics 53 (5): 557–574. https://doi.org/10.2747/1539-7216.53.5.557
Laruelle, Marlene. 2014. "Resource, state reassertion and international recognition: locating the drivers of Russia’s Arctic policy." The Polar Journal 4 (2): 253–270. https://doi.org/10.1080/2154896X.2014.954881
Nae, Adrian. 2022. "Russian strategic narratives on the Arctic region: embedded in strategic documents and narrated by RT and Sputnik." The Polar Journal 12 (2): 363–383. https://doi.org/10.1080/2154896X.2022.2137093
NATO. 2026. "Arctic Security." NATO. https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/deterrence-and-defence/arctic-security
Pincus, Rebecca. 2020. "Towards a New Arctic: Changing Strategic Geography in the GIUK Gap." The RUSI Journal 165 (3): 50–58. https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2020.1769496
Ruiz Palmer, Diego A. 2015. "Back to the Future? Russia’s Hybrid Warfare, Revolutions in Military Affairs, and Cold War Comparisons." In NATO’s Response to Hybrid Threats, edited by Guillaume Lasconjarias and Jeffrey A. Larsen, In NDC Forum Papers Series, 49–72. Rome: NATO Defense College. https://www.ndc.nato.int/fr/download/back-to-the-future-russias-hybrid-warfare-revolutions-in-military-affairs-and-cold-war-comparisons/
Sergunin, Alexander. 2024. "Understanding Russia’s Arctic Security Strategies." Strategic Analysis 48 (6): 634–650. https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2025.2460225
Westerlund, Fredrik, and Johan Norberg. 2016. "The Fighting Power of Russia’s Armed Forces in 2016." In Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year Perspective – 2016, edited by Gudrun Persson, 67–96. Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI).
Zysk, Katarzyna. 2019. "Russia’s Strategic Underbelly: Military Strategy, Capabilities, and Operations in the Arctic." In The Russian Military in Contemporary Perspective, edited by Stephen J. Blank, 687–724. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press.
